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GIDEON MEETs GOLDBERG:
THE CASE FOR A QUALIFIED RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
WELFARE HEARINGS
Stephen Loffredo*
Don Friedman **
In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court held that welfare re-
cipients have a right under the Due Process Clause to notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard before the state may terminate
assistance. However, the Court stopped short of holding due process
requires states to appoint counsel to represent claimants at these
constitutionally mandated hearings. As a result, in the vast majority
of administrative hearings involving welfare benefits, claimants-
desperately poor, and often with little formal education-must ap-
pear pro se while trained advocates represent the government.
Drawing on the theory of underenforced constitutional norms, first
articulated by Dean Lawrence Sager of the University of Texas
School of Law, this Article argues that state legislatures have an in-
dependent constitutional duty to recognize and fund a qualified right
to appointed counsel at welfare administrative hearings. Although
the courts feel themselves to be institutionally constrained from im-
plementing the Due Process Clause to its full extent, elected repre-
sentative officials suffer from no such incapacity. Indeed, they must
conscientiously enforce the requirements of due process to protect
against the "brutal need" poor people will suffer if erroneously de-
prived of subsistence benefits, and also to assure administrative in-
tegrity. This Article concludes with a legislative proposal that aims
to effectuate the due process mandate of counsel at welfare adminis-
trative hearings, taking into account the direct and indirect cost of
implementation.
* Professor of Law and Director, Economic Justice Project, City University of New York
School of Law. I wish to thank Helen Hershkoff for her valuable comments on an earlier
draft of this Article.** Managing Attorney, Empire Justice Center, Long Island Office at Touro Law Center.
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GIDEON MEETS GOLDBERG:
THE CASE FOR A QUALIFIED RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
WELFARE HEARINGS
INTRODUCTION
Forty years ago, in the landmark case of Goldberg v. Kelly,'
the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Proc-
ess Clause entitled welfare recipients to notice and a meaningful op-
portunity to be heard prior to any termination of subsistence benefits.2
At a minimum, the Court ruled, due process requires adequate, pre-
deprivation notice of the basis for the welfare department's proposed
action, followed by an opportunity to contest the action in an admin-
istrative hearing bearing most of the elements of a judicial proceed-
ing, including, an impartial adjudicator, a proceeding on the record,
and the right to appear in person, to confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses, to adduce evidence through testimony and docu-
ments, to present written and oral arguments, and to be represented
by counsel. The Court justified this holding, in large measure, on its
finding that the stakes for a welfare recipient facing loss of her means
of survival, were "simply too high," and the risk of erroneous depri-
vation too great to permit any less protective process.4
In theory and aspiration, Goldberg placed faith in the adjudi-
cative process to safeguard a poor person's basic dignity and welfare.
1 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
2 Id. at 267-68.
3 Id. at 266-7 1.4 Id. at 264, 266.
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The reality, however, gives much cause for concern. Each year in
New York State, tens of thousands of desperately poor families5 fac-
ing termination or denial of subsistence benefits seek redress at ad-
ministrative hearings (known as "fair hearings") conducted by the
state's Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA").
These are adversarial proceedings, which as a practical matter, con-
stitute the forum of first and last resort for the overwhelming majority
of poor families.6 The stakes for the individuals who must turn to
these administrative hearings could hardly be higher. Loss of subsis-
tence benefits almost invariably precipitates harms of the most dire
sort: hunger, homelessness, lack of proper medical care, family disso-
5 New York State's public assistance levels currently bring a poor family to less than fifty
percent of the federal poverty line. The maximum monthly public assistance grant for a
household of three in New York City is $691. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§
352.2, 352.3 (2008). The 2008 federal poverty level for a household of three is $1,466.66
per month. See 73 Fed. Reg. 3971 (Jan. 23, 2008). The federal poverty level is a measure
that itself vastly understates the income necessary to afford minimally decent housing and
nutrition. See NANCY K. CAUTHEN & SARAH FASS, NAT'L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY,
MEASURING INCOME & POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (2007), available at
http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text-707.pdf; SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO, ECON. POLICY
INST. BRIEFING PAPER #165, BASIC FAMILY BUDGETS: WORKING FAMILIES' INCOMES OFTEN
FAIL TO MEET LIVING EXPENSES AROUND THE U.S. 2 (2005), available at
http://www.epi.org/briefingpapers/165/bpl65.pdf. Families with income at or below fifty
percent of the federal poverty line are considered to be in "deep poverty." See SHARON
PARROTT & ARLOC SHERMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, TANF AT 10:
PROGRAM RESULTS ARE MORE MIXED THAN OFTEN UNDERSTOOD 4 (2006), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/8-17-06tanf.pdf.
6 As a formal matter, fair hearing decisions issued by the OTDA are subject to judicial
review in state court. See N.Y. C.P.L.R art. 78 (McKinney 2008). These decisions may also
be subject to challenge in a plenary action in state or federal court.. See infra notes 16-22 and
accompanying text. As a practical matter, however, it is nearly impossible for an unrepre-
sented party-especially one in the throes of the existential crisis typically occasioned by a
loss of subsistence benefits-to mount such a challenge in the courts. A Westlaw search of
all New York State courts for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, revealed a total of two adjudi-
cated pro se Article 78 proceedings challenging a fair hearing decision issued by OTDA.
See Rodriguez v. Doar, 838 N.Y.S. 2d 456 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2007); Sarokina v. Hansell,
846 N.Y.S. 2d 592 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 2007), appeal dismissed, 886 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y.
2008). During this same three-year period, approximately 65,000 public assistance appli-
cants and recipients received unfavorable fair hearing decisions. Thus, even assuming that
the number of reported Article 78 dispositions understates the number actually filed by a fac-
tor of 30, the rate of pro se appeals would still be less than one in one thousand.
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lution, and worse. Yet in all but one or two percent of these adjudica-
tions, only one party-the local welfare department-is represented
by a trained advocate. In nearly ninety-nine percent of the cases, in-
cluding thousands of adjudications upholding a denial or termination
of a family's subsistence benefits, the individual claimant must fend
for herself without the assistance of an expert adviser.
This state of affairs raises several troubling questions. First,
and most glaringly, is whether unrepresented welfare claimants actu-
ally receive the "due process of law" promised by Goldberg, or
whether the absence of counsel, in at least a significant proportion of
these cases, denies vulnerable families any meaningful opportunity to
be heard. It should surprise nobody that in the exceedingly complex
area of social welfare law, an unrepresented and untrained welfare
claimant frequently has little or no knowledge of her procedural and
substantive rights, nor any idea of how to assert those rights effec-
tively in an adversarial proceeding. Thus, the prospect that the ab-
sence of counsel routinely results in the loss of legal rights and the
erroneous deprivation of basic subsistence benefits looms disturb-
ingly large.
Related to these due process concerns are well-known and
much discussed systemic issues, sounding in equality and equal ac-
cess to justice, which go to the legitimacy, vel non, of a legal system
that apportions important rights in accordance with ability to pay.7 If
it is true that welfare claimants' inability to afford counsel results in
7 See Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Justice Under Law: Connecting Principle to Practice, 12
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 47 (2003); Jack B. Weinstein, The Poor's Right to Equal Access to
the Courts, 13 CoNN. L. REv. 651 (1981).
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the non-assertion of sustainable legal claims and defenses, with con-
sequent loss of entitlements providing for the most basic human
needs, then one must ask whether New York State's system of wel-
fare adjudication not only fails to comport with due process, but also
offends elemental rule-of-law norms and the fundamental principle of
"equal justice under law."
The answer to this systemic question, according to a recent
resolution and report of the American Bar Association, would appear
to be an emphatic, though unfortunate, "yes." In 2006, the ABA's
Task Force on Access to Civil Justice issued a Report concluding that
the Nation's commitment to the principle of "equal justice for all"
has gone largely, and in many cases, disastrously unfulfilled due to
the absence of a right to counsel in civil cases. Accordingly, the Task
Force proposed, and the ABA unanimously adopted, a resolution urg-
ing federal and state governments "to provide legal counsel as a mat-
ter of right at public expense to low income persons in those catego-
ries of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake,
such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child
custody, as determined by each jurisdiction. 8
Describing this Resolution as "a Careful, Incremental Ap-
proach to Making Effective Access to Justice a Matter of Right,"9 the
accompanying Report explains that its call for a civil right to counsel
is limited to "high-priority categories" involving adversarial proceed-
8 American Bar Association House of Delegates, Task Force on Access to Civil Justice,
1 12A (Aug. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06AI 12A.pdf
9 Id. at 12.
2009] 279
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ings where "the most basic of human needs are at stake."' Included
in this class of "high-priority categories" are "quasi-judicial" admin-
istrative adjudications involving "basic human needs .... includ[ing]
denials of or termination of government payments or benefits."'"
Hence, the ABA has designated welfare "fair hearings" a proceeding
to which a civil right to counsel should urgently attach, though it rec-
ognized that public provision of representation by "trained and su-
pervised non-lawyer advocates" may be "sufficient" in this context.'
Taking the ABA Report and Resolution as a starting point,
this Article sets forth a more detailed argument for a right to repre-
sentation in welfare fair hearings in New York State. In tune with the
approach reflected in the ABA Report, this Article proposes a tar-
geted right to representation that would address the current system's
most serious due process deficits, yet be tailored in a way that reflects
political and budgetary realities. Part I of the Article briefly de-
scribes the administrative and judicial forums available for adjudica-
tion of welfare claims in New York State, with a particular focus on
the structure, procedural framework, and actual operation of adminis-
trative "fair hearings," the forum that finally determines rights, obli-
gations, and penalties in the vast majority of welfare disputes in the
State. Part II examines the constitutional status of a "right to coun-
sel" in disputes involving subsistence benefits. It provides a doctrinal
survey and critique of the most salient Supreme Court cases, as well
as an analysis and critique of the New York Court of Appeals deci-
1o Id.
Id. at 12-13.
12 Id. at 14.
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sion rejecting a federal due process claim for assigned counsel at wel-
fare hearings. Part III argues that the state Legislature should make
provision for counsel in certain welfare proceedings as a matter of
constitutional duty and sound public policy. Drawing on the theory
of "underenforced constitutional norms," this Part maintains that the
courts' refusal to declare a judicially enforceable due process right to
counsel in welfare proceedings stems principally from institutional
and separation of powers concerns pertaining to the limited role and
capacity of the judiciary; that such rulings, therefore, ought not be re-
garded as definitive statements of the full meaning and scope of con-
stitutional due process; that legislators and other government officials
not constrained by factors that may circumscribe the judicial func-
tion, have an independent duty to enforce constitutional norms to
their full meaning, even where courts believe themselves institution-
ally incapable of doing so; and that core principles of due process
recognized in Goldberg'3 and reaffirmed in Mathews v. Eldridge14
compel the conclusion that due process requires public provision of
counsel in at least certain welfare hearings because the interests at
stake are of the first order, the risk of erroneous deprivation is intol-
erably high when the individual must defend herself without the as-
sistance of a skilled advocate, and the societal costs of wrongfully
expelling destitute families from programs that provide for "brutal
need" tips the balance decisively in favor of a targeted right to gov-
ernment-funded counsel. Part IV concludes the Article with a pro-
posal for structuring and implementing a qualified right to legal rep-
13 397 U.S. at 267.
14 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
2009]
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resentation at fair hearings coupled with a proposal for modest proce-
dural reforms to reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation for indi-
viduals appearing without representation.
I. ADJUDICATION OF WELFARE RIGHTS IN NEW YORK STATE
As of May 2008, more than one million households in New
York State relied in whole or in part on public cash assistance and
food stamp benefits for basic sustenance.15 Eligible families in New
York receive this assistance as a matter of statutory and state consti-
tutional right.1 6 Rights pertaining to these basic subsistence programs
may be formally asserted-and disputes adjudicated-in three fora:
administrative "fair hearings" conducted by the State Office of Tem-
porary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA"); 7 Article 78 proceedings
(for review of agency determinations) 8 or plenary proceedings in
state court; 19 and plenary individual or class action proceedings in
federal court.20
15 NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF TEMP. AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, TEMPORARY AND
DISABILITY ASSISTANCE STATISTICS 1 (2008), available at
http://www.otda.state.ny.us/main/bdma/2008/2008-05-stats.pdf.
16 N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131, 131-a (McKinney 2008).
17 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 22 (McKinney 2005); N.Y COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit.
18, § 3580-1.1 (2007).
18 N.Y. C.P.L.R. art. 78 (McKinney 2008).
19 See, e.g., Allen v. Blum, 447 N.E.2d 68, 68 (N.Y. 1983) (challenging ongoing welfare
policy properly brought as a declaratory judgment action rather than an individual Article 78
proceeding).
20 Disputes involving a federally supported assistance program, see, e.g., the federal Food
Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq, other federal statutory rights, see, e.g., the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, or federal constitutional rights, may give rise to a federal
cause of action directly under the relevant statutory provision, or pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (2000). See generally SARGENT SHRIVER NAT'L CTR. ON POVERTY LAW, FEDERAL
PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS Ch. 5 (2006), available at
http://www.povertylaw.org/poverty-law-library/research-guides/fed-practice-manual/2006-
chap-5.pdf.
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In reality, all but a miniscule percentage of such disputes are
finally adjudicated at an administrative fair hearing.21  New York
State law authorizes judicial review of agency determinations after an
evidentiary hearing if a petition is filed within four months of the dis-
22puted agency action, but as a practical matter, this path is not open
to welfare claimants without access to counsel. Rather, in the over-
whelming majority of cases, the adjudication of welfare rights in
New York occurs exclusively through the administrative hearing
process.23 For this reason, we focus on the question of whether indi-
gent claimants who find themselves invoking the administrative hear-
ing process ought to be provided with counsel at government expense
as a matter of right.24
A. The Fair Hearing System in New York State
Unlike most States, New York uses a two-tiered structure for
welfare program administration, dividing authority between the state
government and "local social services districts., 25  The state-level
21 See supra text accompanying note 5.
22 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 217 (McKinney 2008).
23 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
24 An alternative approach might consider whether government-funded counsel ought to
be provided not at the administrative hearing stage-where an assessment and triage of tens
of thousands of cases could be required-but rather at the judicial stage-where the adminis-
trative process will have winnowed out many cases (those in which the claimant prevailed)
that did not most urgently require counsel and the magnitude of the endeavor might seem
more manageable. Though there is some merit to this approach, we believe that the in-
volvement of basic sustenance counsels earlier intervention to guard against unjustified and
potentially grave deprivations; earlier intervention would also have additional salutary ef-
fects that would reduce the incidence of erroneous administrative decision making, see infra
text accompanying notes 183-86, and thereby avoid any increased strain on judicial re-
sources.
25 Each county in New York constitutes a social services district, with the exception that
the five counties of New York City comprise one district. N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 61
(McKinney 2003).
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agency, OTDA, articulates and enforces statewide policy, exercises
authority over the local districts, and operates the administrative ap-
peals system throughout the State. 26 The local social services dis-
tricts administer the state's public assistance programs at the ground
level, operate the welfare centers, render decisions on applications
and ongoing eligibility issues, and generally serve as the point of con-
tact between the welfare system and its intended beneficiaries.
Each year, OTDA receives over 200,000 requests for "fair
hearings" to contest an action taken, or conversely, an act not taken,
by a local social services district.27 OTDA's Office of Administrative
Hearings ("OAH") employs approximately 140 hearing officers28 -
sometimes referred to as "administrative law judges" ("ALJ")-to
conduct hearings and recommend dispositions for the appeals. As a
formal matter, the OTDA Commissioner, or the Commissioner's des-
ignee, must render a decision on each appeal; 29 in practice, a super-
vising AU serves as the Commissioner's designee for these pur-
poses.30  The local social services districts appear at fair hearings
through an "agency representative," a trained advocate who presents
the local agency's case and defends its actions.31 A typical docket for
an OAH hearing examiner contains twenty to thirty hearings per
26 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 17, 22.
27 NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF TEMP. AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT
9, http://www.otda.state.ny.us/main/news/OTDA-AnnualReport2007.pdf (stating that in
2007 there were 241,920 requests for hearings, and 109,030 hearings were held).
28 E-mail from Russell Hanks, Deputy General Counsel of OTDA, to Don Friedman,
Managing Attorney, Empire Justice Center (Sept. 4, 2008, 13:54 EST) (on file with authors).
29 NY SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 17, 22.
30 See NEW YORK STATE MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES AND HEARING
OFFICERS Ch. 2, available at
http://www.cs.state.ny.us/pio/hearingofficermanual/manual for.hearing-officers.pdf.
31 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REG'S. tit. 18, § 358-5.7.
[Vol. 25284
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day.32 The average time to conduct a welfare fair hearing in New
York City is approximately seven minutes.33
B. Legally Prescribed Hearing Procedures
State statutes and regulations set forth the procedural rules
that formally govern the administrative appeals process. 34 Any appli-
cant for, or recipient of public assistance, food stamps, Medicaid, or
certain other types of assistance may request a hearing to challenge
the local welfare agency's action or inaction on her case. 35 The state
must inform all such appellants of their "right to representation by le-
gal counsel, or by a relative, friend, or other spokesman, or that he
may represent himself;" '36 of the "availability of community legal ser-
vices" for the hearing procedures; "of the types of information he
may wish to submit" at the hearing; and of "additional information
which would clarify" the procedures and would assist the individual
to better prepare for the hearing. 37 Appellants have a right to exam-
ine their case records in advance of the hearing, and at the hearing it-
self, and also have the right to receive-upon request-a copy of all
the evidence the local agency intends to submit, as well as any other
document in the agency's possession the appellant identifies as nec-
essary to prepare her case. 38 The local agency must provide this ma-
32 E-mail from Russell Hanks, Deputy General Counsel of OTDA, to Don Friedman,
Managing Attorney, Empire Justice Center (Aug. 28, 2008) (on file with authors).
33 Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property, 93 COLUM. L.
REv. 1668, 1714 (1993).
34 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 22; N.Y.COMp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 358-1.1.
35 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 22(3), (5); N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 358-2.4.
36 N.Y. SOC SERV. LAW § 22(12)(c).
" Id. § 22(12)(d), (f), (g).38 N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS., tit. 18, §§ 358-3.4(b), 358-4.2(c), (d).
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terial to the appellant at a reasonable time before the date of the hear-
ing if the appellant makes her request sufficiently in advance of the
hearing.39
The hearings themselves are adversarial proceedings presided
over by an "impartial" hearing examiner from the OTDA's Office of
Administrative Hearings. 40 The hearing officer bears a general re-
sponsibility for ensuring the fairness of the proceedings and is di-
rected by regulation to "elicit documents and testimony, including
questioning the parties and witnesses, if necessary, particularly where
the appellant demonstrates difficulty or inability to question a wit-
ness."4' However, the hearing officer may not "act as a party's repre-
sentative. 42 A representative of the local agency "must appear at the
hearing" with the appellant's case record and "a written summary of
the case," and must be "prepared to present evidence" and argument
in support of the agency's action or failure to act.43 The appellant has
the right to appear in person and/or through counsel, to present his
case, to offer documents, to bring witnesses, to examine evidence
presented by the agency, and to question agency witnesses. 44 The lo-
cal agency bears the burden of proof in all cases involving a reduc-
tion or termination of assistance.45 The appellant bears the burden in
cases challenging a denial of an application or the adequacy of assis-
39 Id. at §§ 358-3.4(c); 358-3.7(b). See also Rivera v. Bane, Index No. 045305/1992 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1995).
40 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 18, § 358.
41 Id. § 358-5.6(a), (b)(3).
42 Id. § 358-5.6(b)(3).
43 Id. § 358-4.3(b).
44 Id. § 358-3.4.
45 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 18, § 358-5.9(a).
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tance. 46 All hearing decisions must be based upon "substantial evi-
dence ' 47 and only upon evidence entered into the record.48
C. Reality of Process at Fair Hearings
Unfortunately, the formal and quasi-judicial nature of the
hearing process as described by state statute and regulation bears lit-
tle resemblance to the actual experience of thousands of individuals
who must negotiate this system each year. Pro se appellants are fre-
quently unaware of, or do not understand how to assert the array of
formal rights, obligations, and procedures that govern the fair hearing
process. For example, although all appellants have a right to obtain
copies of the local agency's evidence in advance of the hearing-a
right that is critical to the preparation of a meaningful defense-this
right is almost never effectively invoked by pro se appellants.49
Many factors, including confusing notices, language barriers, educa-
tion level, physical and mental disability, and the intense stress
brought on by threats to subsistence benefits, may impede effective
participation in the hearing process by the pro se appellant.50 In addi-
46 Id. § 358-5.9(a).
41 Id. § 358-5.9(b).
48 Id. § 358-6.1(a).
49 Conversation between Randal Jeffrey, attorney at the New York Legal Assistance
Group, and Plaintiffs' Counsel in Bane (on file with the authors); Conversation between Ian
F. Feldman, former Assistant Attorney-in-Charge, The Legal Aid Society, Bronx Trial Of-
fice, currently Litigation Director, Disability Rights Project, Urban Justice Center (Aug.
2008) (on file with authors).
50 Two-thirds of the adults receiving public assistance in New York State have not com-
pleted high school and approximately ten percent of adult recipients in New York City lack a
ninth grade education. Testimony of New York State OTDA Commissioner David A. Hansell
Before the New York State Assembly Social Services Committee: Hearing to Assess the Ade-
quacy of the Public Assistance Grant in New York State 5 (Sept. 6, 2007); New York City
Department of Social Services, Human Resources Administration, "HRA Facts Quarterly
Supplement" (2008), available at
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tion, the pressure of a docket that routinely consists of twenty-five to
thirty hearings per day-and generates hearings that average seven
minutes apiece-seems inconsistent with the full realization of the
procedural safeguards prescribed by state law, especially in the case
of unrepresented appellants.
Although the lack of detailed data poses a challenge for as-
sessing the adequacy of the hearing process, the accumulated experi-
ence of advocates around the State allows us to describe a typical pro
se hearing chronology. 5' The process ordinarily begins when the in-
dividual receives a notice indicating that an application has been de-
nied, or that benefits will be reduced or terminated. These state-
prescribed notices are often as long as eight pages and provide a
wealth of information, but in language and with technical detail that
challenges even experienced advocates. As a result, the majority of
appellants do not fully comprehend the legal basis for the agency de-
cision or the procedural rights available to them. But even in cases
where the appellant does understand the nature of the agency's claim
and the basic structure of the hearing process, the pro se appellant is
often not in a position to prepare her case effectively. An individual
may know, for instance, that her application was denied because she
failed to present a particular document. Her defense may be intui-
tively sound: perhaps she had made diligent, but unavailing, efforts to
locate and produce the document. But there is little chance she will
http://www.nyc.govIhtml/hra/downloads/pdf/hrafacts-2008_04.pdf.
51 The actual hearing experience of these advocates coupled with comparative information
they obtained from clients who appeared pro se at a hearing, and from review of transcripts
and recordings of pro se hearings provide a more accurate window into the experience of the
unrepresented appellant. Two such transcripts are reproduced in the Appendix to this Arti-
cle.
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know or have the research capacity to learn that once she made a rea-
sonable, but unsuccessful effort to obtain a required document, the
agency was legally required to assist her. Moreover, if a fee was re-
quired to obtain the document, the agency was obligated to pay the
fee if she could not afford it.52 Furthermore, there is the chance the
particular document had been improperly demanded because it did
not bear on benefits eligibility. The complexity of this seemingly
simple situation pales in comparison with, for example, the legal and
factual issues involved in a denial of benefits based on immigration
status.53
Many pro se appellants thus arrive at the hearing anxious and
ill-prepared. They are called into the hearing room where they often
do not understand fundamental elements of the process they confront.
Many appellants do not know that the hearing officer is a state em-
ployee and the agency representative is there on behalf of the local
district, that the proceeding is adversarial, or that appellants have a
range of procedural rights, including the right to cross-examine the
agency representative or compel the appearance of out-of-court de-
clarants whose statements the agency seeks to introduce. Typically,
the only people present in the hearing room are the hearing officer,
the agency representative, and the appellant. Where necessary, an in-
terpreter may attend and the appellant may be joined by a friend, rela-
tive, or in rare instances, a trained representative. In the adversarial
proceeding about to commence, the agency representative is a trained
advocate who is familiar with welfare rules and procedures, and often
52 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 351.5(a).
53 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 122; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 18, § 349, 373.
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has extensive experience in fair hearing advocacy. The appellant is
most likely unfamiliar with welfare rules and procedures and has at-
tended few, if any, hearings.
The hearing officer should make an introductory statement
outlining the manner in which the hearing will proceed and the issues
to be addressed. The agency representative then presents the
agency's evidence in support of its determination. Formal rules of
evidence do not apply,54 and in the vast majority of hearings, the
agency's evidence consists entirely of documents, computer records
and hearsay statements from the appellant's case record. In theory,
the appellant must be given an opportunity to examine and object to
the agency's evidence before it is taken into the record, but hearing
officers frequently do not honor this right, especially in the case of
pro se litigants. In New York City, where roughly two-thirds of all
hearings in the state are held, the agency representatives do not have
personal knowledge of the appellant's circumstances and must there-
fore rely upon the documents in the agency's "evidence packet" to
construct an account of the case. The local agency in New York City
does not produce appellants' case records at fair hearings, although
state law requires it.55 To the extent the documents do not afford the
representative a complete narrative of the events leading to the
agency determination, the representative will often "testify" to fill the
factual gaps in a manner consistent with the agency's position. Pro
se appellants rarely, if ever, challenge these unsubstantiated state-
ments, or otherwise exercise their right to confront and cross-examine
14 Id. § 358-5.9.
55 Id. § 358-4.3(c); see also Greer v. Blum, 462 F. Supp. 619, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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adverse witnesses; nor do the hearing officers take steps to facilitate
the exercise of this right.
Once the agency completes its case, the hearing officer should
invite the appellant to present her side, but too often the invitation is
not forthcoming. Instead, the hearing officer may attempt to expedite
the process by asking the appellant one or two questions that the offi-
cer believes most pertinent. Faced with a perpetually crowded calen-
dar, hearing officers frequently express the need to move the pro-
ceedings to an expeditious conclusion. After a total duration of fewer
than ten minutes, the typical hearing comes to a close, and the appel-
lant is instructed to wait for a decision.
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN WELFARE CASES: A CONCISE
DOCTRINAL SURVEY
Thus far, no federal or New York State court has ruled that a
welfare claimant has a right to publicly funded representation in a
civil proceeding involving subsistence benefits. The closest approach
to such a ruling appeared in Goldberg, where the Supreme Court held
that welfare recipients have a due process right to an evidentiary
hearing prior to termination of benefits, and that in light of the
weighty personal interests at stake and the high risk of erroneous dep-
rivation, recipients must be afforded procedural safeguards, including
the right to retain counsel if desired.56 On this last point, Justice
56 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263-64, 266, 270-71. Though stating that the "pre-termination
hearing need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial," and characterizing the
process due as "minimum procedural safeguards," the Court went on to prescribe a set of
procedural rights nearly unique in administrative adjudication and very close in effect to a
regular judicial proceeding. Id. at 266-67. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process
Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM, L. REV. 1973, 1977-78 (1996) (arguing that the
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Brennan wrote for the Court:
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of lit-
tle avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard
by counsel." We do not say that counsel must be pro-
vided at the pre-termination hearing, but only that the
recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so
desires. Counsel can help delineate the issues, present
the factual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct
cross-examination, and generally safeguard the inter-
ests of the recipient. We do not anticipate that this as-
sistance will unduly prolong or otherwise encumber
the hearing.57
Read in isolation, this passage may seem internally inconsistent. It
opens with the critical recognition that in many cases a welfare re-
cipient's right to be heard "would be of little avail" without the assis-
tance of counsel. 58 But the Court immediately shifts direction, de-
clining to require provision of counsel "at the pre-termination
hearing," even though the absence of appointed counsel would leave
most welfare claimants-who by definition lack the funds to retain a
lawyer-without the very procedural safeguard the Court had just de-
clared essential to afford a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 9
Though this passage may easily be mistaken as rejecting a
right to state-funded counsel at welfare proceedings, Justice Bren-
nan's opinion in fact did no such thing. At the time the Court consid-
ered and decided Goldberg, New York State administered a two-
Goldberg Court "transformed welfare... from a mere privilege completely unprotected by
due process to a property right subject to the most stringent procedural safeguards available
in the United States legal system").
57 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270-71 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
" Id. at 270.
59 Id.
[Vol. 25292
GIDEON MEETS GOLDBERG
tiered scheme of welfare appeals composed of a pretermination proc-
ess and an independent, more extensive post-termination "statutory
'fair hearing.' ,,60 The Goldberg Court merely declined to order pro-
vision of counsel at the pretermination phase in this two-tiered ap-
peals scheme.61 Moreover, the Court expressly cautioned that it had
calibrated the "minimum procedural safeguards" required at the pre-
termination proceeding, "bear[ing] in mind that the [post-termination]
statutory 'fair hearing' [would] provide the recipient with a full ad-
ministrative review." 62  In other words, the Court's analysis of the
process due at the pre-termination stage assumed that any welfare
claimant who did not prevail there would have recourse to a full-
blown "statutory 'fair hearing' " at which more ample procedural
protections would come into play.63 And, notably, the Court assumed
that the enhanced procedural safeguards at these "statutory 'fair hear-
ings' " would include a right to publicly funded representation; Jus-
tice Brennan expressly recited that federal regulations due to take ef-
fect imminently "would give recipients a right to appointed counsel
at 'fair hearings.' , 64
The Goldberg Court had no occasion to decide whether due
60 Id. at 266-67.
61 Id. at 270-71.
62 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266-67.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 258 n.3 (citing Social & Rehab. Servs., Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 34
Fed. Reg. 1144 (Jan. 24, 1969) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 205) (emphasis added)). Dis-
turbingly, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare revoked the requirement of ap-
pointed counsel, without any explanation, soon after Goldberg was decided. See Social &
Rehab. Serv., Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 35 Fed. Reg. 8448 (proposed May 29,
1970), 35 Fed. Reg 10,591 (June 30, 1970) (final). The amended regulations continued to
offer states federal matching funds to provide counsel to welfare claimants in administrative
and judicial proceedings. Social & Rehab. Serv., Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare 35 Fed.
Reg 10,591.
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process mandated state-funded counsel at the "statutory fair hearing,"
affording "full administrative review" to recipients who did not suc-
ceed in their less formal, pretermination proceedings. Nor did Gold-
berg settle the question of whether states would have to provide
counsel in a single-tiered system-such as the one New York State
currently operates-offering welfare recipients a one-shot, "full ad-
ministrative review" prior to termination of assistance. 65 Neverthe-
less, the logic of the Court's due process analysis strongly implied a
right to assistance of counsel at some point before a decision to ter-
minate subsistence benefits became final. As Justice Black argued in
his dissent, although the Court mandated "only the opportunity to
have the benefit of counsel at the administrative hearing ... it is dif-
ficult to believe that the same reasoning process would not require
the appointment of counsel., 66 Indeed, at least some federal and state
welfare administrators contemplated that public financing for such
counsel would be necessary.67
Though Goldberg may have pointed towards a right to repre-
sentation in welfare proceedings, any hope for judicial enforcement
65 New York State abandoned its two-tier system of administrative appeals-under which
local welfare officials conducted the predeprivation hearings and the state conducted the
postdeprivation "fair hearings"--after the Second Circuit ordered it to comply with federal
regulations prohibiting reduction or termination of assistance prior to the offer of a state
conducted fair hearing. See Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971).
66 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 278-79 (Black, J., dissenting). Though a dissenting justice's
"slippery slope" objections often do not provide a reliable guide for assessing the import of
the majority opinion, Justice Black's observation here was entirely reasonable. If the mean-
ingful opportunity to be heard guaranteed by due process often required assistance of coun-
sel, and welfare claimants by definition lacked the resources to retain such counsel, Gold-
berg had moved doctrine to within a short step of a right to state-funded representation, even
with respect to the pretermination proceedings in New York's two-tiered administrative ap-
peal structure. The argument for appointed counsel in the current, single-tier appeal system
presents an a fortiori case.
67 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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of such a right faded almost immediately. Before the year was out,
the Warren Court's "once glittering crusade to extend special consti-
tutional protection to the poor" went into a "retreat" that soon "turned
into a rout., 68 The Burger Court's retrenchment reached beyond sub-
stantive welfare rights to encompass even purely procedural rights-
an area in which the judiciary had traditionally felt most capable-
prematurely ending a nascent jurisprudence of access to civil justice
for the poor.69
The first front in this doctrinal retrenchment appeared in the
area of judicial filing fees and costs. 70 After ruling in Boddie v. Con-
necticut71 that due process requires states to waive filing fees for in-
digents in divorce proceedings, the Court all but closed the door to
such claims in United States v. Kras.72 In Kras, the Court ruled five-
to-four that an indigent seeking to discharge his debts in bankruptcy,
but unable to pay the Bankruptcy Court's filing fee, had no due proc-
ess or equal protection right to a fee waiver.73  The Court distin-
guished Boddie on two grounds. First, it asserted that Boddie's rea-
soning rested crucially on the fact that states hold a "monopol[y]...
[over] the means for legally dissolving [marriage]," whereas govern-
68 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 148
(1980); see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1627-72 (The Foundation
Press, Inc. 2d ed. 1988); Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1306-13, 1333 (1993).
69 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 56, at 1973 (observing that by 1978, the Supreme Court had
issued nine decisions scaling back its procedural due process jurisprudence).
70 For a thorough description and critique of these cases, see Frank I. Michelman, The Su-
preme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part I, 1973
DUKE L.J. 1153.
7' 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
72 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
73 Id. at 443-47.
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ment held no analogous monopoly with respect to Kras; a debtor de-
nied access to the bankruptcy courts is not without recourse, the
Court said, because he may "in theory... adjust his debts by negoti-
ated agreement with his creditors., 74 Second, the Court explained,
the personal interests in Boddie-involving "the marital relationship
and ... the associational interests that surround the establishment and
dissolution of that relationship"-had been recognized as having high
constitutional significance, whereas Mr. Kras's interest in eliminating
his debt burden, "although important ... [did] not rise to the same
constitutional level., 75 Notably, the Court left open the possibility
that an individual's interest in securing "basic necessities" might be
of sufficient constitutional magnitude to alter the due process calcu-
lus.7 6
Such a scenario reached the Court only a year later, in Ort-
wein v. Schwab,77 but the involvement of "basic necessities" in that
case had no perceptible impact on the Court's analysis. In Ortwein, a
five-member majority upheld Oregon's appellate filing fee against a
due process challenge brought by a recipient of old age assistance
who sought judicial review of an administrative action reducing his
subsistence payments.78 The Court parried Mr. Ortwein's invocation
of Goldberg with the dubious logic that since Goldberg only guaran-
74 Id. at 444-45.
75 Id.
76 In discussing the nature of the personal interest at stake, the Court observed that "[i]f
Kras is not discharged in bankruptcy, his position will not be materially altered in any consti-
tutional sense. Gaining or not gaining a discharge will effect no change with respect to basic
necessities." Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
7 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (5-4 decision) (per curiam).
78 Id. at 656-57, 661.
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teed a pretermination administrative proceeding (which Mr. Ortwein
had received), and "due process does not require a state to provide an
appellate system,"7 9 a filing fee denying Ortwein the opportunity to
be heard in court does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment. 80 The
Court distinguished Boddie with the summary assertion that Mr. Ort-
wein's interest in increased welfare payments has "far less constitu-
tional significance than the interest of the Boddie appellants" in judi-
cial dissolution of their marriages. 81 As in Kras, the Court did not
deny the importance of the private interest at issue; nor, however, did
it identify the quantum of "constitutional significance" necessary to
trigger a due process right to judicial access, or set forth a doctrinal
framework for undertaking that analysis, or explain why Mr. Ort-
wein's urgent and intense interest in his old age payments fell short.8 2
Though highly under-theorized, Kras and Ortwein plainly
communicated the Burger Court's view that economic interests-
even perhaps the interests of those living on the margins of subsis-
tence-were insufficient to warrant a judicially mandated commit-
ment of public funds to open the courts to those unable to purchase
79 Id. at 660 (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894)).
80 The dissenters in Ortwein quite rightly took the majority to task for resting its argument
on an implied premise that states could constitutionally cut off any judicial remedy for
agency action denying "a preexisting right." See id. at 661-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id
at 665 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 659 (majority opinion). Ortwein's circumstances otherwise exactly paralleled
those of the divorce claimants in Boddie. As the Court noted in Kras, "Boddie was based on
the notion that a State cannot deny access, simply because of one's poverty, to a 'judicial
proceeding (that is) the only effective means of resolving the dispute at hand.' " Kras, 409
U.S. at 443 (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376). The judicial review Ortwein sought was
plainly "the only effective means of resolving the dispute" with the Oregon Public Welfare
Division once it had issued a final determination reducing his benefits. Boddie, 401 U.S. at
376.
82 Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 658-61.
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admission.83 The Court made little attempt to construct a rationale or
offer a reasoned justification for the ad hoc lines that it had drawn;
but there was no mistaking its determination to reverse the perceived
activism of the Warren years and create firm barriers against further
expansion of the "due process revolution. 84 In light of these rulings,
it was nearly unimaginable that the Court would follow Goldberg's
analysis to its logical conclusion and find a due process right to state-
funded representation in welfare proceedings. Indeed, eight years af-
ter Ortwein, the Supreme Court extinguished any lingering doubt on
this score with its deeply troubling decision in Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services,85 discussed below. But even before the Supreme
Court handed down Lassiter, the New York Court of Appeals ruled
directly that welfare claimants have no Fourteenth Amendment right
to assigned counsel in fair hearings.86
Brown v. Levine concerned a recipient of aid to the disabled
who requested a fair hearing to challenge a proposed termination of
his benefits.87 After the hearing examiner informed Mr. Brown that
83 See Michelman, supra note 70, at 1162-65.
84 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 68, at 760-61 (commenting on the Supreme Court's "nar-
rowed ... understanding of the substantive scope of the 'life, liberty, and property' [inter-
ests] entitled to due process protection" and the Court's "devalued assessment of... what
process is due"); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L.
REV. 885, 968 (2000) (discussing the Supreme Court's movement away from the "due proc-
ess revolution" to a regime that "tend[s] to defer to legislative judgments about what proce-
dures are appropriate in different contexts," and noting that this "more deferential attitude
has held the costs of due process hearings in check").
85 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
86 Brown, 333 N.E.2d at 377.
87 Id. at 375. Aid to the disabled was a federal-state-funded and state administered pro-
gram for destitute disabled individuals. It was subsequently replaced by the federally admin-
istered Supplemental Security Income program. See Social Security Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(1972)).
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the agency's "termination charges contained . . . serious allegations
which, if proved, might constitute fraud,, 88 Brown sought and re-
ceived two adjournments for the purpose of obtaining counsel. When
his efforts proved unavailing-he did not have the funds to retain
counsel, and the local legal services office, overwhelmed by its exist-
ing caseload, could not offer him assistance 89- Brown asked the
hearing examiner to appoint counsel to represent him. The hearing
examiner refused and Brown appealed to the New York courts, alleg-
ing violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses.90
In a brief and thinly reasoned opinion, the New York Court of
Appeals rejected Brown's claims. After acknowledging the presence
of "an important property interest," entitled to due process protection,
the court (1) recited the state regulations governing fair hearing pro-
cedures; 9' (2) opined (without reference to the record or any other
source) that the hearing process "while it may be adversarial in form,
is largely . . . inquisitorial," and "would appear designed to minimize
inaccuracies and to assure quality and fairness in adjudication,, 92 and
(3) summarily concluded that "legally trained advocates, however de-
sirable, would not appear essential to ensure fairness to either side."93
This comprised the entirety of the court's affirmative analysis.94
88 Brown, 333 N.E.2d at 378 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
'9 Id. at 379 n.*.
90 Id. at 375 (majority opinion).
9' Id. at 376.
92 Id.
93 Brown, 333 N.E.2d at 376.
94 The court also summarily rejected Brown's claim that the "potential for criminal prose-
cution for welfare fraud" ought to call forth a right to counsel, and distinguished a New York
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Regrettably, the Court of Appeals declined to engage seri-
ously with the claims presented in Brown. The opinion lacks careful
analysis, rests in significant part on counterfactual speculation about
the nature of welfare hearings, and fails to set forth the constitutional
rule against which the challenged state policy would be measured.
This last omission is not merely one of form. The court neglected to
address even the most basic components of a due process analysis: it
made no fact based inquiry into whether Mr. Brown, or others in
similar circumstances, could receive a "meaningful" opportunity to
be heard without the aid of counsel; there was no discussion of the
nature and complexity of the issues to be adjudicated at the fair hear-
ings, the level of skill and resources required for effective preparation
and presentation of claims and defenses at the hearing, the ability of
Mr. Brown to perform any of these tasks pro se, or any other factor
relating to the risk of erroneous deprivation or the extent to which
provision of counsel might mitigate that risk.95
In place of any such analysis, the court simply declared that
New York's fair hearing regulations "would appear designed to
minimize inaccuracies and assure quality and fairness in adjudica-
tion,, 96 and-as though this observation self-evidently disposed of
the issue-jumped directly to the conclusion that due process never
requires publicly funded representation at a welfare hearing. The
precedent that required provision of counsel to indigent parents in child neglect proceedings
on the ground that such proceedings involved a "fundamental" interest and right. Id. at 377.
95 Although Mathews was not decided until the year after Brown, the pillars of due proc-
ess analysis-nature of private interest, risk of erroneous deprivation, and potential benefit
of enhanced procedural protection-had already been established in Goldberg itself. See
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263-66.96 Brown, 333 N.E.2d at 376.
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flaws in the court's approach should be apparent. For one thing, vir-
tually any system of adjudicatory procedural rules-including any
state system of criminal procedure-is "designed to minimize inaccu-
racies and ensure quality and fairness, 97 yet at least since Gideon v.
Wainwright,98 that fact alone has never been accepted as sufficient to
defeat a due process claim for assigned counsel. The Court of Ap-
peals made no attempt to distinguish New York's wholly unremark-
able fair hearing procedures from any run-of-the-mill set of proce-
dural rules, nor point to any extraordinary protections for pro se
appellants that could support a categorical and binding presumption
against the need for publicly funded counsel.99
The court's rationale was further undermined by its reliance
on an inaccurate description of the fair hearing process, one directly
at odds with the state's fair hearing regulations. Those regulations
(which the court held out as a reliable description of the state's fair
hearings process earlier in its opinion) provide for adversarial pro-
ceedings at which the local welfare agency's case is presented by ex-
perienced personnel trained for the purpose, and over which the hear-
ing examiner presides as a neutral and impartial adjudicator, with
little or no regulatory duty or authority to guide or assist an unrepre-
97 See id; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (construing the F.R.C.P. as "secur[ing] the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding").
98 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
99 The regulations recited by the court required: (1) notice of adverse administrative ac-
tion, together with information on how to request a fair hearing, the availability of commu-
nity legal services and the right to bring a representative to the hearing; (2) unreduced aid
payments pending the outcome of the hearing; (3) an "impartial" hearing officer and deci-
sion based on the record; (4) no "[t]echnical rules of evidence"; and (5) "[t]he right to testify,
to produce witnesses and evidence and to cross-examine." Brown, 333 N.E.2d at 376.
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sented claimant.'00 Yet the court casually brushed aside these regula-
tory provisions and declared-with no citation at all-that fair hear-
ings were in fact not "adversarial" proceedings, but rather "inquisito-
rial" ones, and the local welfare departments were not "invariably"
represented by trained advocates.' 1 The court's counterfactual char-
acterization of the fair hearing process certainly supported its argu-
ment against a due process right to counsel, but there was no basis for
that characterization in the law or, apparently, in the record.
Judge Fuchsberg issued the lone dissenting opinion. Drawing
on Goldberg, he emphasized the gravity of an individual's interest in
preserving relief payments, the loss of which might "threaten" the
person's "very survival;" the importance of the right to defend
against any such loss at a "due process hearing;" and the recognized
right to be represented by counsel in that proceeding. 102 Echoing Jus-
tice Black's dissent, Judge Fuchsberg reasoned that since a "legiti-
mate welfare recipient ... is, by definition, unable to afford to pay
counsel, the Supreme Court's grant of the right to counsel" in Gold-
berg would be "an empty gesture" unless counsel "or the means to
procure it is provided."'0 3 Unlike the majority, Judge Fuchsberg ac-
curately described fair hearings as "adversary proceeding[s]" at
which the welfare agency "most often is, represented by counsel."' 0 4
100 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 18, § 358-1,1.
101 Brown, 333 N.E.2d at 376.
'02 Brown, 333 N.E.2d at 378 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
103 Id. Some commentators and courts, including, apparently, the Brown majority, have
misread Goldberg as declining to find a right to publicly funded counsel at administrative
proceedings challenging a termination of welfare benefits. See supra notes 56-68 and ac-
companying text (elaborating on the Goldberg Court's discussion of a right to state provided
counsel).
104 Brown, 333 N.E.2d at 379 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). Under current regulations, the
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Noting that unrepresented litigants, "especially in matters where im-
portant legal rights are contested," are likely "to find themselves
handicapped by ignorance or even fear of the law" and "lack of the
expertise required for effective advocacy,"' 5 the dissent concluded
that at least in some cases, a welfare claimant "should not have to
rely on administrative paternalism or the haphazardness of self-
representation," and instead is entitled to the assistance of counsel.10 6
The Court of Appeals' summary rejection of Mr. Brown's due
process claim, though breathtaking, reflected the waning fortunes of
antipoverty politics and jurisprudence in the mid-1970s, and the
growing reluctance of state and federal judiciaries to "impos[e] costly
due process requirements in what might be seen as large-scale intru-
sions into government programs."' 0 7 Ironically, the court twice al-
luded to the desirability of assigned counsel at welfare hearings,10 8
implicitly acknowledging that the presence of trained advocates
would significantly affect process and outcomes, a fact highly rele-
vant to the due process calculus. But, rather than pursue that insight
through a textured constitutional analysis, the court offered a weakly
reasoned justification for a result it appears to have reached on a
local welfare departments must appear through a representative at every hearing, N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 358-4.3(b), unless it obtains prior permission from the OTDA in
an exceptional case to appear "on papers only, . . . where the rights of the appellant can be
protected and the personal appearance of the agency is neither feasible nor necessary." Id. §
358-4.3(c). Agency representatives need not be, and typically are not, attorneys.
' Brown, 333 N.E. at 377 (Fuchsberg J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 379.
107 See TRIBE, supra note 68, at 710. Consistent with this general trend, the New York
Court of Appeals, earlier in the same year that it decided Brown, rejected an indigent's due
process claim for assigned counsel in divorce proceedings. In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 453
(1975) (4-3 decision).
10 Brown, 333 N.E.2d at 376-77.
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blunter, unspoken rationale: that any decision to commit substantial
public resources to legal counsel for welfare recipients, even where
due process norms may require it, belongs to the legislature, not the
judiciary. 0 9
Six years later, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,'' 0
a five-to-four majority of the Supreme Court further reduced the
prospects for judicially enforceable rights to state-funded counsel in
civil proceedings. The specific holding in Lassiter was that North
Carolina did not deprive an indigent mother of due process when it
permanently terminated her parental rights through an adversarial
proceeding at which she could not afford an attorney, and the state
refused to provide one.'"1 Lassiter's full significance, though, far ex-
ceeds this holding because the majority there announced a striking
new "presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed
counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical
liberty."" 12 This categorical presumption against the right to counsel,
Justice Stewart explained, would be weighed against and would ordi-
narily override the generally applicable and otherwise controlling due
process analysis prescribed by Mathews v. Eldridge.1 3  In other
words, even if application of the Mathews test-which assesses the
109 Id. That this consideration supplied the overriding motivation for the court was re-
flected as well in Judge Fuchsberg's dissent. Anticipating the "cry of cost" that would greet
a decision requiring counsel at fair hearings, and answering his colleagues' choice of judicial
method and approach, Judge Fuchsberg described the issue at hand as involving "an essential
of the administration of justice, a matter peculiarly within the province of our branch of gov-
ernment," and "respectfully suggest[ed] that in such matters courts are called upon to take
the lead rather than exercise restraint." Id. at 325.
t0 452 U.S. at 18.
"' Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24-32.
112 Id. at 26-27.
113 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 331-35.
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demands of due process by balancing the private interests at stake,
the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government's countervail-
ing interests" 1-pointed decisively to the need for court-appointed
counsel, the majority's new presumption would oust that analysis and
dictate the contrary result, except in an extraordinary case.
One need only examine the circumstances in Lassiter itself to
get an idea of just how exceptional a case is required to be in order to
win a right to counsel in a civil setting. Characterizing the issue as
"whether the three [Matthews] factors, when weighed against the pre-
sumption that there is no right to appointed counsel in the absence of
at least a potential deprivation of physical liberty, suffice to rebut that
presumption,"' 1 5 Justice Stewart gave the following account of those
factors in Ms. Lassiter's case:
[T]he parent's interest is an extremely important one
(and may be supplemented by the dangers of criminal
liability inherent in some termination proceedings);
the State shares with the parent an interest in a correct
decision, has a relatively weak pecuniary interest, and,
in some but not all cases, has a possibly stronger inter-
est in informal procedures; and the complexity of the
proceeding and the incapacity of the uncounseled par-
ent could be, but would not always be, great enough to
make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the par-
ent's rights insupportably high.116
In any other context, this lopsided alignment of the Mathews factors
would unquestionably lead to the conclusion that due process de-
114 Id.
115 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
116 Id.
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manded the additional procedural safeguard. Yet the Court invoked
its new presumption to conclude that "the Constitution [does not] re-
quire[] the appointment of counsel in every parental termination pro-
ceeding,"1' 7 and did not require it in Ms. Lassiter's case. This ruling
left open the possibility that the presumption against appointed coun-
sel might be overcome in a particular case if "the parent's interests
were at their strongest, the State's interests were at their weakest, and
the risks of error were at their peak," this assessment to be made on a
case-by-case basis by the trial court. 1 8
As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent, the majority's
refusal to establish generally applicable due process parameters for
North Carolina's parental termination proceedings broke from the
Court's consistent prior approach of assigning due process require-
ments through "case-by-case consideration of different decisionmak-
ing contexts, not of different litigants within a given context."'1 9 In
theory, Lassiter's litigant-specific approach to due process overrode
Brown's categorical ruling against a right to counsel in any welfare
proceeding, 2 ° and opened the way for particular welfare claimants to
make individualized, hearing specific due process demands for repre-
sentation. Yet, Lassiter's introduction of its own quasi-categorical
analysis-the presumption against a right to counsel in civil cases-
and the potency with which it endowed that new presumption, would
almost certainly neutralize this limitation on Brown as a practical
1.7 Id. at 31.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120 See supra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
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Ill. ARGUMENT FOR A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN WELFARE
HEARINGS
In this Part we argue that the courts' refusal to enforce a due
process right to counsel in Lassiter, Brown, and similar cases
stemmed principally from institutional and prudential considerations
having to do with the judiciary's reluctance to impose what it regards
as substantial fiscal liabilities on state governments; 121 that core due
process principles, reaffirmed by the Court in cases such as Goldberg
and Mathews, nevertheless mandate public provision of counsel in
certain proceedings at which subsistence benefits are in jeopardy; and
that legislators-who are not constrained by the institutional and
separation-of-powers concerns that may counsel judicial restraint-
bear a broader obligation, both constitutionally and as a matter of
sound policy, to remedy the actual denial of due process experienced
by thousands of impoverished welfare claimants in New York State
each year.
A. The Right to Counsel as an Underenforced
Constitutional Norm
The starting point for our analysis is the idea that courts often
"underenforce" constitutional norms, especially those that appear in
the Constitution's open-textured clauses. The theory of underen-
121 See TRIBE, supra note 68, at 710 (linking the retrenchment in due process jurispru-
dence to the Supreme Court's reluctance to impose costly procedural requirements on gov-
ernment).
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forced constitutional norms, developed by Lawrence Sager in 1978122
and now widely recognized by constitutional scholars, 23 asserts that
courts often decline to enforce constitutional provisions to their full
meaning for reasons of perceived institutional incapacity or deference
to political processes.1 24 When courts defer on such grounds, the the-
ory holds, the resulting judicial action ought not be viewed as the de-
finitive "statement about the meaning of the constitutional norm in
question.' 25  Rather, the full measure of the constitutional norm-
beyond the portion the judiciary feels competent to enforce-should
be regarded as binding other governmental actors. 126
The Supreme Court's right-to-counsel jurisprudence-indeed,
its access-to-justice jurisprudence generally-bears the hallmarks of
underenforcement. When Lassiter reached the Court, the basic tenets
122 Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1220-21 (1978).
123 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1299-1303 (2006). Fallon also argues that the Supreme
Court has itself recognized the divergence between pure constitutional norms and the judicial
standards deployed to enforce them. Id. at 1281-83. See also Mitchell N. Berman, Constitu-
tional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2004); Kermit Roosevelt III, Aspiration and
Underenforcement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 193 (2006).
124 See Sager, supra note 122, at 1212.
125 Id. at 1221. An updated and elaborated version of the theory of underenforced consti-
tutional norms appears in LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAIN CLOTHES: A THEORY OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004).
126 The theory of underenforced constitutional norms, while never expressly acknowl-
edged by the Supreme Court, but see Fallon, supra note 123, at 1281-83, recently appeared
in Justice Breyer's dissent in Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Garrett held that the employment discrimination provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act exceeded Congress' civil rights power because the statute imposed du-
ties "far exceed[ing] what is constitutionally required." Garrett, 531 U.S. at 358. Writing
for the four dissenters, Justice Breyer explained that the Court's earlier decision in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), which declined to apply
"heightened scrutiny" to "disability discrimination claims," did not reflect a judgment about
the outer limit of protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment to people with disabili-
ties, but rather rested on institutional and separation of powers considerations that did not
apply to the legislative branch, and therefore, do not cabin the constitutional duties and pow-
ers of Congress. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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of due process, and the analytical framework for determining its con-
tours in specific contexts were both well established. 127 In particular,
Mathews had directed courts to calibrate due process demands by
balancing three factors: the gravity of the individual interest at stake,
the risk of erroneous deprivation under the challenged procedures
(and the value of adding additional safeguards) and the government's
interests.12 8 Application of the Mathews analysis in Lassiter, the ma-
jority effectively conceded, would have compelled a ruling that states
must guarantee the assistance of counsel in parental termination pro-
ceedings.12 9 Yet the Court declined to follow the settled doctrine to
its logical conclusion, opting instead to interpose a new, previously
unheard of, and almost entirely undertheorized "presumption" against
a right to counsel in cases not involving a threat to physical liberty. 130
127 See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 331-35.
128 Id. at 334-35 (listing the factors for the colloquial "Mathews test").
129 Canvassing the Mathews factors, the Court found that the parent has a "commanding"
interest at stake and faces a "unique kind of deprivation" and "[t]he State may share the indi-
gent parent's interest in the availability of appointed counsel" because "accurate and just re-
sults are most likely to be obtained through the equal contest of opposed interests." There-
fore, "the State's interest in the child's welfare may perhaps best be served by a hearing in
which both the parent and the State acting for the child are represented by counsels;" and the
State may have a countervailing but relatively weak interest in cost savings; few parents will
be equipped to represent themselves effectively, making the risk of erroneous deprivation in
many cases "insupportably high." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27-31. Thus, the Mathews scale
tipped overwhelmingly in favor of requiring provision of counsel.
130 Justice Stewart correctly observed that the cases in which the Court had upheld consti-
tutional claims for appointed counsel had all involved jeopardy to the litigant's physical lib-
erty. Id. at 25 ("The pre-eminent generalization that emerges from this Court's precedents
on an indigent's right to appointed counsel is that such a right has been recognized to exist
only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.") But this
seems a wholly inadequate basis for the Court's grand generalization, since Lassiter itself
was the first case to present the Court with a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for
state-funded counsel in a setting where physical liberty was not at stake. Moreover, nothing
in the cases Justice Stewart cited-which were decided either on Sixth Amendment grounds,
or on the basis of Mathews-like balancing-intimated that anything other than the governing
due process analysis ought to be invoked to evaluate claims for counsel in other contexts.
Nor did Justice Stewart advance any such rationale. See Steven D. Schwinn, The Right to
Counsel on Appeal: Civil Douglas, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 603, 604-07 (2006).
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In essence, Lassiter suspended ordinary due process analysis with re-
spect to constitutional claims for assigned counsel: the strictures of
due process in that respect were no longer to be determined by the
settled test for fundamental fairness; rather, an "insensitive presump-
tion" 131 against the indigent litigant would ordinarily control. The
Court, to this extent, declined to enforce the constitutional norm to its
full (or even previously recognized) meaning, for reasons having no
apparent connection with the substance or values of the Due Process
Clause.
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly articulate an
institutional or separation-of-powers rationale for its presumption
against a right to counsel, it is difficult to view Lassiter as anything
other than an instance of underenforcement. The Court offered no
reason rooted in due process values for its departure from settled doc-
trine, and none was apparent. To the contrary, it makes no analytical
sense to single out the right to counsel and exclude it from the other-
wise universally applicable framework for determining whether due
process is satisfied in a particular context. At bottom, the right to
counsel is simply a procedural safeguard-categorically indistin-
guishable from any other procedural safeguard-the presence or ab-
sence of which a court might need to assess in applying the Mathews
test. Yet the Court placed this particular procedural safeguard-and
only this one--outside the ordinary due process framework, without
justifying that special exclusion by reference to fundamental fairness,
risk of erroneous deprivation, or procedural reliability; that is to say,
"i' Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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without any reason having a discernible connection to the purpose or
values underlying the Constitution's due process guarantee. 13 2  It is
for this reason that Lassiter is most intelligible through the lens of
underenforcement; not as a judgment about "fundamental fairness,"
but rather as a prudential determination to cabin the so-called "due
process revolution"-and calm the institutional, federalism, and sepa-
ration-of-powers concerns it carried in its wake-by drawing a doc-
trinally arbitrary line to close the "floodgates" the Court apparently
feared. '33
Viewed in this way, cases such as Lassiter and Brown should
be understood as speaking only to the question of judicially enforce-
able due process rights; not as defining the full reach of the Constitu-
tion's due process guarantee or as absolving other governmental ac-
tors of their independent duty to effectuate constitutional norms to
their full meaning.134 For purposes of this Article, we define the "full
132 This point is underscored by the marked contrast between Lassiter and a companion
case decided on the same day, Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), in which the Court
unanimously held that due process required Connecticut to pay for a blood grouping test re-
quested by an indigent respondent in a paternity suit.
133 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 42, 58-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (characterizing the
Court's analysis as resting on an "insensitive presumption" designed to avoid a ruling (re-
quiring counsel in parental termination proceedings) that would "open the 'floodgates' that,
I suspect, the Court fears."); JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE Ch. 1 (1985) (describing the rise and decline of the "due process revolution"). Politi-
cal and ideological shifts on the Court undoubtedly played an important role as well. See
Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between Judicial Mini-
malism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1826-29 (2004) (tracing the Supreme
Court's retreat from its expansive due process jurisprudence of the late 1960s and early
1970s and attributing the "Court's rapid shift in direction ... in large part to politics" in the
form of conservative appointments to the Court).
134 We do not mean to suggest that Lassiter has foreclosed any argument for a judicially
enforceable constitutional right to representation along the lines proposed in Part IV of this
Article. That proposal targets cases in which the private interest is greatest and the risk of
erroneous deprivation most acute (due to special incapacity of the claimants and/or special
difficulty in presenting claims and defense without assistance of a trained advocate); the
proposal also limits the financial burden on government by stipulating that representation
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measure" of the due process norm conservatively, as coextensive
with the Mathews test, free of the presumption imposed by Lassiter.
We now apply this established standard to New York State's current
system of welfare hearings-an exercise yet to be undertaken by any
court135-as a yardstick of nonjudicial officials' duty to protect the
due process rights of families facing loss of basic subsistence bene-
fits.
B. The Legislative Duty to Ensure Due Process for
Welfare Claimants
Regarded as a defining precedent,13 6 Mathews opened its
analysis by reaffirming the elemental tenets of due process: that the"
'right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of
any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of
may be provided by attorney-supervised advocates who need not themselves be attorneys.
The proposal is therefore distinguishable from the forum-wide claim rejected in Lassiter, and
consistent with the scenario that Lassiter recognized as presenting a viable due process ar-
gument.
135 Goldberg's discussion of a right to assigned counsel at the informal, pretermination
hearing assumed a two-tiered system of administrative review and availability of assigned
counsel at the postdeprivation, "full administrative review;" Goldberg had no occasion to
discuss or decide whether due process would require assigned counsel in an administrative
review system of the kind currently operating in New York State. Brown was decided before
Mathews v. Eldridge, and did not apply the three-factor test established by that discussion.
136 See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 636 (West
7th ed. 2004) ("All courts must now apply the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to deter-
mine the type of procedures that are required by due process .... ); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 981 (Aspen Publishers 5th ed. 2005) ("In almost all cases raising
questions of procedural regularity, the Court refers to the Mathews test."). Many commenta-
tors, while recognizing Mathews 's preeminence, view it as a retreat from the "normative rea-
soning" that produced Goldberg and as a rejection of the human dignity value of due process
in favor of an instrumental, utilitarian approach. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its
Splendor, 56 BROOK L. REv. 789 (1990); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Proc-
ess Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976); see also Charles A. Reich, Be-
yond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56 BROOK L. REv. 731, 732
(1990) ("Mathews v. Eldridge represents an outlook that treats the government's claims as
having greater urgency than the claims of individuals-even when there is nothing to justify
the government claims.").
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a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society' "1l37 and that
due process guarantees an opportunity to be heard " 'at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.' "' 38 Against this backdrop, the
Court set forth what has become the authoritative standard for deter-
mining what process is constitutionally mandated in any given con-
text:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct fac-
tors: First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi-
tional or substitute procedural requirement would en-
tail. 139
As demonstrated below, the Mathews factors weigh sharply in favor
of mandating publicly funded representation in at least certain cate-
gories of welfare hearings that present an especially acute risk of er-
roneous deprivation.
1. The Private Interest
An impoverished family threatened with termination or reduc-
tion of subsistence benefits faces the severest sorts of injury and pri-
vation: eviction, homelessness, hunger, family dissolution, dangers of
137 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951)).
138 Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
139 Id. at 335.
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shelter or street life, illness, and lack of medical care, to name a few.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the special gravity of
this private interest, most notably in Goldberg, where discussing the
constitutional requirement of a predeprivation hearing, the Court ob-
served that
[f]or qualified recipients, welfare provides the means
to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medi-
cal care. Thus the crucial factor in this context-a
factor not present in the case of the blacklisted gov-
ernment contractor, the discharged government em-
ployee, the taxpayer denied a tax exemption, or virtu-
ally anyone else whose governmental entitlements are
ended-is that termination of aid ... may deprive an
eligible recipient of the very means by which to live..
. .Since he lacks independent resources, his situation
becomes immediately desperate. 140
Similarly, in Mathews, the Court acknowledged that welfare claim-
ants inhabit a uniquely vulnerable position, living "on the very mar-
gin of subsistence,"'14 1 dependent on benefits of last resort 142 that, if
removed, would leave them destitute and without recourse. 143  The
magnitude of this private interest and the gravity of the harm that er-
140 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (citations omitted).
141 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340.
142 The cash assistance programs known as "welfare" (in New York State the Safety Net
Assistance program, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 157-159, and the "Family Assistance" pro-
gram, N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 350 et seq.), are residual programs, available only to individu-
als and families who cannot meet basic subsistence needs through resort to any other gov-
ernment program (e.g., social security, state disability, unemployment insurance, Workers
Compensation, etc.) and who have no adequate savings or access to other resources for their
support. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131, 131-a.
141 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340-41, 342 (contrasting circumstances of a Social Security dis-
ability recipient with those of a welfare recipient and noting that the former but not the latter
would have access to other government assistance and sources of support in the event of a
benefit termination).
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roneous deprivation would inflict explain the special status of welfare
benefits in due process jurisprudence, singled out as the only gov-
ernment entitlement that may not be terminated without opportunity
for a predeprivation hearing.
Goldberg and Mathews thus teach that a needy family's stake
in receipt of subsistence benefits constitutes an exceptionally impor-
tant private interest for purposes of due process analysis, an interest
superior in kind and in magnitude to other economic interests. Still,
some might argue that any private interest in a government entitle-
ment ranks relatively low in the due process pecking order, a hierar-
chy that generally values liberty interests above mere property inter-
ests. It is certainly true that the Court's due process jurisprudence
implies such a hierarchy, but it would not be accurate to dismiss a
poor family's interest in avoiding wrongful deprivation of its material
means of survival as a mere property interest, comparable in constitu-
tional gravity to all other property interests. To the contrary, as we
have seen, the Court has treated welfare benefits as sui generis for
due process purposes, precisely because erroneous deprivation can
immediately result in severe and irreparable injuries involving health,
physical integrity, personal danger, and family unity, all interests that
sound in liberty more than property.
The Second Circuit captured this point neatly in a jurisdic-
tional decision that turned on a doctrinal distinction between personal
and property interests: "Since welfare cases by their very nature in-
volve people at a bare subsistence level, disputes over the correct
amounts payable are treated not merely as involving property rights,
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but some sort of right to exist in society, a personal right under the
Stone formula." 144 Similarly, federal and state courts have uniformly
ruled that even a small reduction of welfare benefits-unlike eco-
nomic losses in other contexts--constitutes "irreparable harm," satis-
fying the strict criteria for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. 145
In sum, the Supreme Court has recognized a poor person's in-
terest in subsistence benefits as an exceptionally important one,
unique among governmental entitlements, and superior to ordinary
property interests for due process purposes. It is akin, in both practi-
cal and conceptual respects, to personal liberty interests, the invasion
of which touches on "brutal need" and almost inevitably causes
"grievous loss" and irreparable injury: it is an individual interest that
weighs heavily in the Mathews balance.
2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation and Probable
Value of Additional Procedural Safeguards
Though nominally designed to accommodate pro se litigants,
welfare administrative hearings are in form and function adversarial
proceedings at which the local welfare agency appears through a
trained expert advocate. It is difficult to generalize about the risk of
erroneous deprivation in this setting because many of the hearings-
in New York City especially-function as one imagines an interven-
tion by a conscientious supervisor at a welfare center should function:
144 Johnson v. Harder, 438 F.2d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1971). Johnson upheld an assertion of fed-
eral civil rights jurisdiction over statutory welfare claims, noting that such jurisdiction turned
on a distinction between personal and property interests (only the former qualifying) and that
the Supreme Court had repeatedly upheld such jurisdiction in welfare cases. Id. at 13.
145 See, e.g., Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1404 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Numerous cases
have held that reductions in AFDC benefits, even reductions of a relatively small magnitude,
impose irreparable harm on recipient families.").
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as corrective to obvious error, oversight, or nonfeasance. The stag-
gering number of hearings requested in New York City and the sub-
stantial rate at which the claimant prevails reflect this longstanding
bureaucratic reality.146  But in less straightforward disputes-those
involving employment sanctions, for instance-welfare claimants
prevail far less frequently. In such cases, the average welfare claim-
ant's lack of relevant knowledge, skill, or experience all but rules out
even a minimally effective presentation.1 47  With respect to such
hearings-affirming thousands of benefit reductions and terminations
against pro se claimants-there are strong reasons to believe that the
absence of counsel results in an unacceptably high risk of erroneous
deprivation.
146 See supra note 27 and accompanying text; N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Admin.
Law, Dispute Resolution in the Welfare System: Toward an End to the Fair Hearing Over-
load, 48 THE REC. OF THE ASs'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 411 (Feb. 1993) (tracing
unnecessarily high volume of fair hearing requests to lax quality of administration at welfare
centers); N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. On Admin. Law, Administrative Closings and Churn-
ing of Welfare Cases, 45 THE REC. OF THE ASs'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 379 (May
1990). Claimants prevailed in seventy percent of the issues actually adjudicated at welfare
hearings in New York City in Fiscal Year 2007. The Mayor's Management Report Fiscal
2007, Supplementary Indicator Tables 25 (City of New York, Sept. 2007). However, factor-
ing in defaults and withdrawals by either side, the claimant success rate drops to fourteen
percent. Id. Claimant success rate at hearings in other parts of New York State is approxi-
mately one in three.
147 In many ways the Lassiter Court's description of parents in pro se termination pro-
ceedings applies to the plight of welfare claimants attempting to defend their families' sub-
sistence payments without the aid of counsel:
The parents are likely to be people with little education, who have had
uncommon difficulty in dealing with life, and who are, at the hearing,
thrust into a distressing and disorienting situation. That these factors
may combine to overwhelm an uncounseled parent is evident from the
findings some courts have made.
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30. The transcripts of pro se hearings provided in the Appendix simi-
larly reflect the overwhelming circumstances that confront many unrepresented claimants, as
do accounts of pro se hearings in some of the rare judicial appeals. See, e.g., Earl v. Turner,
757 N.Y.S.2d 255 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2003); Nembhard v. Turner, 703 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1999); Lewis v. Barrios-Paoli, 219 N.Y.L.J. 27 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1998).
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First, welfare hearings are adversarial proceedings in form
and in nature. The playing field in pro se hearings slants far from
level because the local agency is represented by trained advocates
who have enormous tactical advantages over the claimant, including
access to case and computer files, knowledge of agency practices,
ability to read and interpret complex, coded agency records, and
knowledge of how to present evidence effectively and cross examine
the claimant. At the same time, state regulations define the hearing
examiner's role as an impartial referee, with very limited obligations
to see to the fair development of the record. 148 It is precisely this
procedural configuration-an adversarial contest in which a skilled
advocate represents one side, but not the other-that poses the most
acute threat to fairness and accuracy. 149
Second, pro se claimants have no realistic opportunity to con-
front and refute the evidence against them. Most such evidence-and
virtually all of it in New York City hearings-consists of computer-
ized agency records laced with codes and jargon indecipherable to the
lay person. A pro se claimant rarely, if ever, sees the evidence
against her in advance of the hearing, and is frequently offered no
148 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. REGS tit. 18, § 358-5.6. By way of contrast, administrative
hearings in the Social Security system are inquisitorial in nature. No advocate presents and
defends the Social Security Administration determination under the challenge. The ALJ has
a clear and wide ranging duty to fully develop evidence that might assist the claimant and to
ensure that the inexperience or incapacity of the claimant does not prejudice his case. See
e.g., Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-
01 (1971).
149 See, e.g., Jerry Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and
Litigation Notes on the Assurance ofAccuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication
of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 776 (1973-1974) (arguing that "fair-
ness" and "accuracy" in adversarial adjudication "cannot be maintained when some parties
lack the resources to be effective adversaries, and that while "complete equality of adversar-
ies is not a realistic goal, certain types of resources"--including "legal counsel".-"are criti-
cal").
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real opportunity to review the evidence at the hearing itself. State
regulations do not require a description of the agency's evidence in
the pretermination notices sent to recipients, 150 and while claimants
have a formal right to request copies of the agency's evidence in ad-
vance of the hearing, 51 the procedure is almost never successfully
invoked by pro se appellants. 152  Moreover, since the rules of evi-
dence do not apply at welfare hearings, 53 local agencies may-and
usually do--"prove" their allegations entirely with hearsay, or even
double or triple hearsay, in the form of computer records purporting
to reflect information from primary records, that purport to reflect
facts gathered from unidentified declarants, who perhaps had per-
sonal knowledge of the facts asserted. Unrepresented claimants have
almost no chance of understanding these agency records much less
refuting the allegations they contain. And without an advocate, the
claimant's right to confront and cross-examine these adverse out-of-
court witnesses-a right held up by the Goldberg Court as essential
to the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the proceeding1 54 -is for
all intents and purposes reduced to a nullity.1 55 And even if, against
1SO See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. REGS tit. 18, §§ 358-2.2, 358-3.3. Cf Brock v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1987) (stating that due process notice must include both
"the naturc of the charges [Land] also.., the substance of the relevant supporting evidence").
151 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. REGS tit. 18, § 358-3.7, 358-4.2(c).
152 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
153 Id. at § 358-5.9.
' Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68 (stating that "confronting [and cross-examining] any ad-
verse witnesses" are required components of "rudimentary due process" and is especially
important "where [welfare] recipients have challenged proposed terminations as resting on
incorrect or misleading factual premises or on misapplication of rules or policies to the facts
of particular cases").
155 As a result of a federal lawsuit, the State's Office of Administrative Hearings issued a
memorandum reminding hearing examiners that appellants have a right to "confront and
cross-examine an adverse witness when the witness' statement is submitted at the hearing (in
the form of a document or testimony from another witness) and the declarant is not present."
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all odds, the uncounseled claimant managed to invoke this right and
obtain subpoenas compelling the presence of adverse witnesses, it is
far beyond the capability of most laypersons to prepare and conduct
even a minimally effective cross-examination.
Third, issues adjudicated at welfare hearings frequently
emerge from a set of bafflingly complex statutory and regulatory
schemes that exceed the grasp even of many administrators. 156  Just
as critical procedural safeguards have become empty formalities for
pro se claimants, so too many legitimate claims, defenses, and sub-
stantive rights go unasserted absent the assistance of a representative.
Consider, for example, the realm of employment mandates and sanc-
tions. In 1996, federal and state welfare reform laws instituted a
Memorandum from N.Y. State Dep't of Social Servs. Office of Admin. Hearings to All Ad-
ministrative Law Judges and Professional Staff (Dec. 15, 1992). State regulations do not
reflect this right, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. REGS tit. 18, § 358-3.4(g), nor are appellants other-
wise apprised of this right through the hearing notice or the ALJs' opening statement. See
N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, OFFICIAL REPORT OF FAIR HEARING-MODEL
OPENING STATEMENT, OTDA- 1962 (Revised 10/01).
156 Fair hearings in New York adjudicate issues arising under, among other areas, the
Medicaid program, the Food Stamps Program and two public assistance programs, TANF
and Safety Net Assistance program. For each of these programs there are interlocking fed-
eral and state statutory and regulatory schemes as well as administrative, interpretive, and
policy materials at the federal, state, and local levels of government (only the Safety Net
program does not have a federal overlay). The cumulative law governing the TANF and
Safety Net programs alone occupies 297 pages of Title 42 of the U.S. Code, 202 pages of
Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 621 pages of New York's Social Services Law,
and 150 pages of Title 18 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations. See generally 42
U.S.C. (2005), 45 C.F.R. (2008); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW (McKinney 2008); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, (2008). The state regulations and policy are set, described and
elaborated upon in the 656-page OTDA Temporary Assistance Source Book and their 265-
page Temporary Assistance and Food Stamps Policy Manual. See N.Y. CTR. FOR
EMPLOYMENT AND ECON. SUPPORTS, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF TEMP. & DISABILITY ASSISTANCE,
TEMP. ASSISTANCE SOURCE BOOK (2008), http://otda.state.ny.us/main/ta/TASB.pdf; CTR. FOR
EMPLOYMENT AND ECON. SUPPORTS, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF TEMP. & DISABILITY ASSISTANCE,
TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE AND FOOD STAMP EMPLOYMENT POLICY MANUAL (2008)
http://otda.state.ny.us/main/resources/employmentmanual/employmentmanual.pdf [hereinaf-
ter OTDA POLICY MANUAL]. This list does not include hundreds of pages of policy direc-
tives regularly published by the federal, state, and local agencies with oversight responsibili-
ties over these programs. It seems beyond dispute that an understanding of the substantive
law or of their procedural rights will far exceed the capacity of laypersons in most cases.
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stringent system of employment requirements under which most re-
cipients, unless exempt, must engage in work activities as a condition
of eligibility. Any willful failure to cooperate with employment re-
quirements, which can include anything from missing a meeting at
the welfare center to a failure to complete the assigned hours of a
work activity, carries a sanction-a reduction or termination of sub-
sistence payments for a period of up to six months-unless the indi-
vidual can demonstrate good cause. 157 But the law also prescribes
procedures, standards, and limitations respecting the assignment of
work activities, and provides certain rights and protections that cir-
cumscribe the scope, grounds, and occasion for imposition of sanc-
tions.158 For instance, an individual may not be sanctioned for failure
to comply with an unlawful work assignment. 59 A work assignment
may be, and often is, unlawful for any of a number of reasons, includ-
ing the absence of an adequate assessment and employability plan; 60
failure to properly process an exemption claim;16 1 failure to account
for the individual's preferences in designating a work activity;' 62 fail-
ure to provide appropriate assistance to a parent in need of child
care;163 assignment of work hours in excess of minimum wage limita-
157 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 341-42.
158 See id. at §§ 331-2, 334, 335-b, 336, 341-42.
159 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 385.11(a)(4)(ii), 385.12(a)(ii),
385.12(a)(3)(ii)(b).
160 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 335(1) - (3); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§
385.6(a)(1), 385.6(b)(1)(i).
161 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 332(1); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 385.2(b).
162 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 335(2)(a); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §
385.6(b)(1)(i)(c).
163 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 332-a, 342(1); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §
385.4(a)(1)(ii).
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tions (often a factually and legally complex issue); 164 failure to make
reasonable efforts to assign college students to workfare positions on
or close to campus;165 failure to make reasonable efforts to assign
work activities that do not conflict with an individual's education or
training schedule; 166 failure to credit countable education and training
activities towards the individual's work requirement; 67 and the list
goes on. 168 Furthermore, certain procedural safeguards apply in the
sanction context. For instance, a welfare agency may not lawfully
initiate an employment sanction unless it offers and properly admin-
isters a "conciliation" process, and reasonably concludes from that
process that the individual has refused "willfully and without good
cause" to comply with employment requirements. 69 Agency failure
to abide by these substantive and procedural mandates, which were
designed to protect poor families against unjustified sanctions, is
common and renders any sanction unlawful. 170 But few, if any, un-
represented claimants are aware of their rights, and so do not assert
them. Nor would it be reasonable to expect pro se welfare claimants
to have the skill or knowledge to develop a record to support the as-
sertion of these rights. For their part, the hearing examiners rarely
164 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 336-c(2)(b); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §
385.9(d)(3)(ii); OTDA POLICY MANUAL at 55.
165 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 336-c(4).
166 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 335-b(2), 336-c(4); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §
385.9(b)(5).
167 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 335-b(2).
168 See DON FRIEDMAN, EMPIRE JUSTICE CTR., AN ADVOCATES GUIDE TO THE WELFARE
WORK RULES 1 (2008), available at
http://www.empirejustice.org/New/Publications/AdvocateGuide/AdvocateGuideWelfareWrk
Rules.pdf.
169 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 341(1)(a), (b); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. §§ 385.1 1(a)(1),
385.11 (a)(4)(i).
170 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 341(1)(b); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS § 385.12(a)(3)(ii)(j).
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inquire into these issues sua sponte, apparently regarding them as af-
firmative defenses. Thus, the absence of representation in this, and
similar settings, routinely and predictably results in erroneous and
unlawful deprivations of subsistence payments to impoverished fami-
lies.
Moreover, the absence of representation can have a devastat-
ing impact on accuracy and fairness even in hearings that do not in-
volve legal rights and defenses unknown and unasserted by pro se
claimants. Some of the most common disputes at welfare hearings
turn on conflicting assertions of fact, often as simple as whether a re-
cipient appeared for an appointment, whether she received notice of
an administrative requirement, or whether a caseworker orally re-
scheduled a meeting. But, as Judge Posner observed in another right-
to-counsel context, "difficulty and complexity are not synonyms.' 71
Seemingly "simple" cases-"he said-she said" scenarios that will
turn on credibility determinations-are often the most challenging to
prepare and present effectively; and they pose especially thorny prob-
lems for the pro se litigant whose own probity may be under assault.
The Supreme Court itself has often warned that the risk of error is es-
pecially high, and the need for special procedural safeguards acute,
where adjudication of protected interests turns on "issues of witness
credibility and veracity."' 172
Finally, the actual, observable impact of legal representation
at welfare hearings strongly confirms the value of that additional
safeguard and the substantial risk of error without it. For example, the
171 Pruitt v. Mote, 472 F.3d 484, 490 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner, J., dissenting).
172 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343-44.
2009]
324 TOURO LA WREVIEW [Vol. 25
rate of unfavorable outcomes for all appellants in adjudicated hear-
ings involving a workfare dispute between 2000 and 2007 was ap-
proximately 30 times greater than the rate for appellants represented
by an attorney-supervised law student from the Economic Justice
Project, CUNY School of Law during the same period.1 73 While the
Court in Lassiter found raw statistics, by themselves, to be "unillu-
minating,"1 74 here the differential in outcomes between pro se and
represented hearings is too striking to dismiss. It plainly demon-
strates that claimants who lack the assistance of an advocate rou-
tinely, unknowingly, and involuntarily forfeit important legal rights,
and suffer erroneous discontinuance of subsistence benefits as a re-
173 The Economic Justice Project (EJP) appeared in over 200 workfare-related hearings
during this interval and had a success rate of approximately 99 percent. Cf Stephen Lof-
fredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes From a Law School Clinic, 150 U. PA.
L. REv. 173 (2001) (describing the project and its commitment to represent CUNY under-
graduates at welfare hearings). EJP accepted for representation any CUNY undergraduate
presenting a workfare-related dispute and did not screen out weak or difficult cases. See id.
During the same years, OTDA affirmed the local agency in adjudicated workfare hearings at
annual rates ranging from approximately 20 percent to approximately 55 percent, see N.Y.S.
OTDA, Bureau of Data Management and Analysis, 2007 Statistical Report on the Operations
of New York State Temporary Assistance Programs Tables 32 and 33, an overall affirmance
rate approximately 30 times higher than in the cases represented by EJP. While the EJP data
set may not qualify as an absolutely random sampling of workfare-related fair hearings, the
differential success rate is far too great to attribute to fortuity or sampling bias. Finally,
though it is true that affirmance rates ranging from 20 to 55 percent (and the corresponding
appellant success rate between 80 and 45 percent) may appear favorable to recipients, it
would be a mistake to interpret these numbers as reflecting adequate procedural protections
for pro se appellants. Only a small fraction of employment sanction determinations are ap-
pealed. In August 2008, for instance, only 400 out of over 8,000 sanctions were taken to a
fair hearing, see NYC Human Resources Administration's Weekly Report (August 31,
2008), and it seems reasonable to assume that these appeals contest many of the most inde-
fensible actions in a class of agency determinations notorious for arbitrariness and unreliabil-
ity. See, e.g., Liz Krueger, Liz Accles & Laura Wernick, WORKFARE: The Real Deal II,
CMTY. FOOD RESOURCE CTR. (July 1997); Sandra Youdelman, The Revolving Door: Find-
ings on NYC's Employment Services and Placement System and its Effectiveness in Moving
People from Welfare to Work, COMMUNITY VOICES HEARD (2005). We therefore assume
that a high proportion of the agency affirmances in this area ratified unlawful benefit reduc-
tions and terminations, an assumption strongly supported by the results of the represented
hearings.
174 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 29 n.5.
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sult.
The statistically observable impact of representation is consis-
tent not only with the risk analysis developed above, but also with
what we know from having attended hundreds of represented hear-
ings, and having read countless transcripts of pro se hearings: the
presence of an advocate powerfully influences the substance and dy-
namic of the proceeding. As noted earlier, the average pro se hearing
in New York takes approximately seven minutes, from start to fin-
ish. 17 5 In a system that adjudicates tens of thousands of hearings,
there will inevitably be wide variations in the quality of process and
threat to accuracy and fairness when the claimant lacks skilled repre-
sentation. But even the most conscientious hearing examiner, with a
docket of twenty-five to thirty scheduled hearings per day, 176 would
be hard pressed to assure fairness and accuracy to pro se claimants on
a consistent basis. Under such a regime, the pressure to truncate the
process and jump to a preconceived or superficially reached conclu-
sion is simply too high.1 77
3. The Governmental Interest
As the Court ruled in Goldberg, the government has an im-
portant interest in avoiding erroneous termination of welfare pay-
ments to impoverished families and individuals.1 78 To this extent, in-
dividual and governmental interests coincide. Moreover, unfounded
175 See supra Part I.A.
176 Conversation with Russell Hanks, Deputy Gen. Counsel of N.Y. Office of Temp. &
Disability Assistance (Aug. 2008) (on file with authors).
177 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
178 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
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denials of subsistence benefits not only inflict harm on the wronged
individuals, but may well increase net public expenditures in the form
of emergency shelter costs for families who become homeless, in-
creased Medicaid and municipal hospital expenditures for those who
take ill, increased social services costs, and child protective costs, to
name just a few of the immediate short-term outlays.179
Of course, the state's fiscal interests figure on the other side
of the ledger as well. First, provision of assigned counsel, even on a
targeted basis, would substantially boost the proportion of repre-
sented hearings from the current level of approximately one percent
and might thereby increase the amount of time, and personnel and
expense required to adjudicate a fixed number of hearings. In addi-
tion, the financial resources necessary to supply free representation to
welfare claimants would not be insignificant, even if the representa-
tion were confined to certain categories of cases, and provided by
nonlawyer advocates under the supervision of attorneys. On the
other hand, the presence of advocates might achieve systemic effi-
ciencies that could reduce expenditures. A representative's ability to
clarify issues and focus on relevant facts and governing law would
frequently streamline the adjudication process. It has also been our
experience that involvement of counsel often produces prehearing
settlements, thus reducing the burden and expense of administrative
adjudication. Finally, the assignment of counsel may, through a vari-
179 Steven Banks, ADR and Litigation Involving Social Problems, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
109, 115-16, (2008); Anna Lou Dehavenon, Charles Dickens Meets Franz Kafka: The
Maladministration of New York City's Public Assistance Programs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 231, 234 (1989-90); Bradley R. Haywood, The Right to Shelter as a Funda-
mental Interest Under the New York State Constitution, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 157,
175-76 (2002).
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ety of mechanisms, including the increased cost to local agencies for
each hearing requested, 180 alter bureaucratic incentives, encourage
greater focus on accurate center-level decision making, and thereby
substantially reduce the overall number of requested and adjudicated
hearings. 181
The last step in the due process analysis calls for a balancing
of the three Mathews factors. Here, that balance compellingly weighs
in favor of publicly funded representation, in at least a significant
proportion of welfare hearings. The destitute family's private interest
is an exceedingly important one. The government's stake in main-
taining subsistence benefits will always rank high in a due process
assessment because any reduction to a welfare grant, which is already
pitched far below the poverty line, immediately robs the family of its
means of survival and threatens its fundamental "right to exist in so-
ciety." 82 The government's overlapping interest in humane and effi-
cient provision for poor families also weighs in favor of providing
representation to welfare claimants. Its countervailing interest in
avoiding the expense of government funded advocates is of lesser and
uncertain significance, since providing the targeted representation
proposed here would yield systemic efficiencies that could partially
180 OFFICE OF TEMP. AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, 2007-08 EXECUTIVE BUDGET (2008);
OFFICE OF TEMP. AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, NYC MONTH-BY-MONTH STATISTICAL DATA
(2008); OFFICE OF TEMP. AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, NYC MONTH-BY-MONTH STATISTICS
(2007); OFFICE OF TEMP. AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE , OAH STATISTICAL DATA (2007);
OFFICE OF TEMP. AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, 2006-07 EXECUTIVE BUDGET (2007); OFFICE
OF TEMP. AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, OAH STATISTICAL REPORT (2005).
"'1 See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the high incidence of inaccurate and unlawful deci-
sion making at the agency level, and the availability of remedial measures that would drasti-
cally reduce the number of administrative appeals and the costs associated with the appeals
process).182 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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or fully offset its cost, and may also avoid vastly larger social costs
down the road. In any event, the state's legitimate, but modest fiscal
interest is far outweighed by the intense private interests at stake. 183
Finally, the risk of erroneous deprivation, though it may vary dra-
matically across the thousands of welfare hearings adjudicated in
New York State, exceeds tolerable levels in substantial categories of
hearings where the absence of a skilled advocate will foreseeably re-
sult in the involuntary nonassertion and forfeiture of legal rights
and/or leave the unrepresented claimant with no realistic prospect of
presenting her case with even minimal effectiveness.
Lassiter recognized that certain alignments of the Mathews
factors in the parental rights setting would tip the scales decisively
enough to overcome the Court's presumption against a right to coun-
sel. As demonstrated above, at least some welfare cases present a
comparably decisive alignment of Mathews factors that would war-
rant a judicially ordered assignment of counsel. But regardless of
whether the courts would enforce a due process right to representa-
tion in the welfare context, the legislature bears a broader, independ-
ent obligation to ensure that individuals receive the full protection of
that constitutional right, undiminished by limiting constructions that
the judiciary, for separation of powers or related institutional reasons,
may adopt as a matter of prudential self-restraint. Even if one re-
gards the full measure of the due process norm as extending no fur-
ther than the Mathews analysis, shorn of Lassiter's presumption,'84
183 Cf Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28 ("[T]hough the State's pecuniary interest is legitimate, it is
hardly significant enough to overcome private interests as important as those here.").
184 But see supra note 136 (citing critiques of Matthews as unduly narrowing the scope
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that analysis makes plain that the absence of counsel from particular
welfare hearings denies due process to many thousands of the state's
poorest and most vulnerable families. The legislature is therefore
duty-bound to act. We now turn to a blueprint for that action.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A QUALIFIED RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
WELFARE HEARINGS
In a system that fully respected due process norms, any per-
son threatened with deprivation of subsistence benefits would have
access to an expert advocate for the adversarial proceeding that, for
all practical purposes offers the sole opportunity to seek redress.
Strong constitutional and policy arguments support legislative action
to achieve this goal. 85 We recognize, however, that universal provi-
sion of counsel at tens of thousands of welfare hearings exceeds the
bounds of current political and fiscal constraint (even though such an
arrangement might catalyze fundamental systemic reforms that would
reduce overall costs). 86 We therefore propose a qualified right to
representation, targeted to priority cases in which the due process
deficit is most severe and indefensible, and the legislature's corre-
sponding duty of remediation most acute. To further limit public ex-
pense, our proposal provides for representation by qualified non-
attorney advocates working under the supervision of an attorney. 87
and impact of due process).
185 See supra Part III.B.
186 See supra Part III.B.3; see infra Part IV.C.
187 Cf Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 499 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (concluding that
due process would be satisfied by publicly funded representation "by... a qualified and in-
dependent adviser who is not a lawyer" if provided, when the state proposes to transfer a
convicted felon from a prison to a mental hospital). The "Civil Gideon" concept presumes,
correctly for the most part, that an individual negotiating a particular legal system is best rep-
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We next discuss the criteria for defining priority hearings, and follow
with proposed mechanisms for identifying hearings that meet these
criteria. We conclude this part with some broader observations and
proposals to protect pro se claimants and improve due process
throughout the welfare bureaucracy.
A. Criteria for Priority Hearings
Tracking the Supreme Court's approach in Lassiter, our pro-
posal calls for provision of representation at those hearings in which
the Mathews factors align most powerfully in favor of the claimant.188
Since the governmental interest will not vary appreciably from hear-
ing to hearing, the determinative factors will be the strength of the
claimant's private interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation ab-
sent the assistance of a qualified advocate.
1. Claimant Stake
As discussed earlier, an impoverished family's interest in re-
taining its subsistence benefits always ranks as an interest of the
highest order because any loss of such benefits can have devastating
resented by a trained advocate who is an attorney. See BOSTON BAR ASS'N TASK FORCE ON
EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, GIDEON'S NEW TRUMPET: EXPANDING THE CIVIL
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASSACHUSETTS 1 (2008), available at
http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/nr_0809/GideonsNewTrumpet.pdf. Although an ideal resolu-
tion might entail a right to assigned counsel in all fair hearings, the fact is that highly effec-
tive advocacy is engaged in daily by advocates who are not attorneys. In the ranks of the
legal services community are many paralegals, social workers, and other community advo-
cates with experience and expertise in the law and practice of public benefits. An effective
but much less costly approach to the need for fair hearing representation could well include
assignment of trained paralegals under the supervision of attorneys.
188 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 (noting that due process might require appointment of
counsel in particular parental termination proceedings if the Mathews factors balanced most
decisively in favor of the parent).
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repercussions. Hence, any case that presents a high risk of erroneous
deprivation absent counsel qualifies as a priority case under our pro-
posal. In addition, cases that threaten unusually severe or immediate
injury should receive counsel regardless of the predicted risk of error.
Such cases would include, at a minimum, claims for emergency assis-
tance, including emergency shelter and assistance to avert eviction or
utility discontinuance; threats of durational sanctions (i.e., disqualifi-
cation from benefit receipt) whether in employment or other con-
texts; i89 claims involving rental supplements, the loss of which would
place the family at immediate risk of homelessness; and cases in
which imminent injury of like magnitude is threatened.
2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
Perhaps the most accurate method of identifying hearings that
present a special risk of error absent counsel is to collect and analyze
data revealing appellant success rates by issue and by representation
status (i.e., pro se, lay representative, or trained advocate). Any sub-
stantial disparity in success rate between represented and unrepre-
sented appellants in a specific category of cases would strongly sug-
gest an especially high risk of error. Our partial comparison of
overall appellant success rates to success rates of appellants repre-
sented by law students from the CUNY Economic Justice Project
("EJP") clinic reveal that such disparities indeed exist.' 90 State offi-
cials ought to adjust OTDA's data collection to permit a more thor-
19 Cf Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341 ("As we recognized last Term... 'the possible length of
wrongful deprivation of... benefits (also) is an important factor in assessing the impact of
official action on the private interests.'
190 See supra Part III.B.2.
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ough and systematic analysis. But even without such data, one can
reasonably identify pro se hearings that present a heightened risk of
error by examining three factors: the issues for adjudication; the dif-
ficulty of preparation and/or presentation; and the capacity of the in-
dividual appellant. Hearings that implicate the more intricate areas of
welfare law (for example, employment requirements and sanctions,
and immigration related eligibility issues) and those at which techni-
cal legal claims or defenses should ordinarily be asserted, present an
acute risk of error for the pro se claimant. 19' Similarly, hearings that
require more than rudimentary fact development and evidence gather-
ing by the appellant, or that might otherwise pose special challenges
for an unrepresented appellant to prepare or present are at special
jeopardy for erroneous disposition.192 Finally, hearings in which the
particular appellant lacks the capacity to represent himself effectively
without an advocate fall into the high risk category. 193
191 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing employment sanction claims and defenses).
192 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
193 While many public assistance claimants possess more than adequate capacity to repre-
sent themselves effectively at administrative hearings, others may be hampered by linguistic,
educational, or mental health issues. See Testimony ofDavid A. Hansell, supra note 50 (stat-
ing that two-thirds of the adults receiving public assistance in New York State have not
graduated high school); William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare
System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1206 n.20 (1983) (citing a study showing lower educational lev-
els and lack of English-language proficiency correlate with inability to navigate the welfare
bureaucracy effectively); EILEEN P. SWEENEY, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,
RECENT STUDIES INDICATE THAT MANY PARENTS WHO ARE CURRENT OR FORMER WELFARE
RECIPIENTS HAVE DISABILITIES OR OTHER MEDICAL CONDITIONS 2, 5 (2000), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/2-29-00wel.pdf (stating that nationally, one-quarter to one-third of the
adult TANF population have a serious mental health problem that might impinge upon their
capacity to represent themselves adequately. This population is also among the most likely
to face sanctions for alleged failures to comply with program requirements.); see also Mark
Nadel, Steve Wamhoff & Michael Wiseman, Disability, Welfare Reform, and Supplemental
Security Income, 65 SOC. SEC. BULL. 14, 20-24 (2003/2004).
332 [Vol. 25
GIDEON MEETS GOLDBERG
B. Mechanisms for Identifying Priority Hearings
The task of sorting through tens of thousands of pro se hear-
ing requests for those that pose special due process concerns presents
significant challenges. On the one hand, our proposal for a qualified
right to counsel requires a reasonably reliable method for identifying,
from an enormous mass of pending pro se hearings, those cases in
which the need for counsel is most pronounced. On the other hand,
since the point of qualifying the right to counsel is cost containment,
the sorting mechanism itself must not entail an expensive new bu-
reaucracy. Bearing these challenges in mind, we propose a simple,
two-pronged system that can identify priority hearings reasonably
well and at minimal cost.
First, categories of hearings that by their nature meet the due
process priority criteria discussed in the previous section would be
designated "priority hearings" and placed on a list for automatic as-
signment of counsel. 194 For instance, a challenge to a denial of emer-
gency assistance to avert an eviction, or a challenge to imposition of
an employment sanction, or a case involving immigrant eligibility for
assistance would automatically qualify for assignment of an advo-
cate. The OTDA's Office of Administrative Hearings could readily
identify such priority list hearings based on the claimant's request for
review. This categorical mechanism would impose virtually no addi-
tional administrative cost and would efficiently capture most of the
194 Over time this list might be modified and informed with the aid of data indicating the
types of cases in which the presence of an advocate is most likely to affect the outcome and
reduce the risk of error. If it does not already do so, the OTDA should compile such infor-
mation so this process can be fine-tuned until such time as representation is more broadly
available.
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hearings that pose a threat of unusually severe injury or heightened
risk of error associated with adjudication in complex areas.
There remains the difficult and sensitive issue of identifying
individual appellants who may lack the capacity to make a minimally
adequate presentation of their claims, either because of personal fac-
tors or because the case turns out to be one that is especially difficult
to prepare and present.'95 An imperfect solution, but one that would
impose few if any additional costs, is to enlist the hearing officers in
the sorting process. The hearing officer has a unique opportunity to
evaluate, on the basis of direct observation, whether a particular pro
se appellant has the capacity to protect her interests. Where the hear-
ing officer concludes the requisite capacity is missing, the appellant
would be offered an adjournment and assignment of an advocate. 196
We acknowledge that even this modest proposal will carry
nontrivial costs and will draw objections from state and local admin-
istrators who view even the current system as unduly cumbersome
and expensive. But, as we discussed in analyzing the government in-
terest prong of the Mathews test, 197 increased presence of counsel at
195 See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
196 Alternatively, hearings that pose a special risk of error because of difficulty of prepara-
tion and presentation could be identified through individualized prehearing reviews con-
ducted by a small "Assigned Counsel Unit," either contracted out by, or internal to, OTDA's
Office of Administrative Hearings. Given the number of hearing requests, the nature of any
such review would have to be very limited, and could simply consist of screening the "sum-
mary of the case" and an "evidence packet" that local agencies are already required to gen-
erate for every hearing. 18 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 358-4.3(b) (listing what
evidence must be presented, including: the challenged agency action, the facts, reasoning,
and evidence supporting it, and the law and policies on which it rests) [hereinafter "evidence
packet"]. These summaries provide a reasonable basis on which to make an efficient and
relatively well-informed assessment of the need for counsel. The advantage to this approach
is that it would likely capture more of the hearings that fall into this due process priority
category. The disadvantage, clearly, is cost.
197 See supra Part III.B.3.
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welfare hearings will alter incentive structures throughout the welfare
bureaucracy in ways that could significantly improve decision-
making quality, 98 and dramatically reduce the extraordinary volume
of appeals processed in New York State each year, yielding substan-
tial offsetting savings.
C. Coda: Protecting Pro Se Claimants and Enhancing
Systemic Due Process
1. Improving Fairness for Pro Se Appellants
Even if accepted, our proposal would leave tens of thousands
of vulnerable families and individuals to defend their subsistence
benefits in an adversarial setting without the assistance of an advo-
cate. Readily achievable process modifications would enhance the
fairness of these hearings for unrepresented appellants and should be
pursued. Here are a few examples: Notices of local agency actions,
currently so lengthy and dense as to defy comprehension by ordinary
individuals, must be redesigned so that they actually and effectively
communicate critical procedural rights and other essential informa-
tion to the recipients. State regulations should be amended to require
automatic provision of the local agency's "evidence packet" and writ-
ten "summary of the case" 199 to all appellants in advance of the hear-
ing date, since it is clear beyond dispute that possession of this in-
198 For instance, a substantial increase in hearings in which the appellant is represented,
with the added costs they would impose, and state and local agency time commitment they
would demand, might impel the state and localities to revisit local procedures and would
hopefully offer a powerful incentive to encourage the informal local resolution of many dis-
putes. Cf supra notes 5-6.
199 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 358-4.3(b).
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formation is essential to basic preparation for the hearing and to any
opportunity to present a meaningful defense.20 0  Finally, the hearing
officer's role should be reconceived, more along the lines of ALJs in
the Social Security appeals system,2 ' such that he or she has a clear
and affirmative obligation to ensure an equitable setting for the ad-
ministration of justice;20 2 and the number of cases assigned to each
200 As noted earlier, state regulations provide that a hearing appellant may request ad-
vanced production of copies of all documents the agency intends to introduce at the hearing.
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.201 Federal regulations and caselaw both impose upon administrative law judges in the
Social Security system an affirmative duty to develop the record "fully and fairly," and gen-
erally to protect the interests of pro se appellants. See Hankerson v. Harris, 636 F.2d 893,
895 (2d Cir. 1980). The Hankerson Court explained:
If ... the claimant does appear pro se, the ALJ has a "duty ... to scrupu-
lously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the
relevant facts .. "
In such cases where the claimant was "handicapped by lack of counsel"
at the administrative hearing, the reviewing court has "a duty to make a'searching investigation' of the record" to ensure that the claimant's
rights have been adequately protected. Applying these principles to the
record before us, we conclude that the ALJ did not adequately protect
the rights of this pro se litigant by ensuring that all of the relevant facts
were sufficiently developed and considered.
Id. at 895 (citations omitted). Unlike welfare "fair hearings," which are adversarial in na-
ture, Social Security appeals proceed on an inquisitorial model. See Herbert M. Kritzer,
American Adversarialism, 38 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 349, 362 (2004) (reviewing ROBERT A.
KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2002)); Carolyn A.
Kubitschek, A Re-Evaluation ofMathews v. Eldridge in Light of Administrative Shortcom-
ings and Social Security Nonacquiescence, 31 ARIz. L. REV. 53, 65 (1989). The presence of
an adverse, trained advocate in the welfare context makes the pro se appellant's need for pro-
tection more acute.
202 A few relatively simple modifications to the hearing officer's responsibilities would
significantly enhance the fairness of the proceeding. For instance, whether or not the appel-
lant has received a copy of the agency's evidence in advance, the ALI should ensure that the
appellant has ample opportunity at the hearing to review these documents and, where neces-
sary, have them explained. Similarly, if at any point in the proceedings, the ALI concludes
that the appellant cannot prevail unless a particular document, statement or other type of
proof is offered, the ALI should advise the appellant of that fact and offer an adjournment.
Since this reconceived role will invariably require that the hearing officer primarily or exclu-
sively assist the appellant, there may be concerns that it would compromise the hearing offi-
cer's duty to remain impartial and not to act as an advocate for one party or the other. See
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 358-4.4. But the glaring imbalance between the par-
ties, the trained, educated, experienced advocate for the local agency and the untrained, often
undereducated and usually inexperienced appellant, overwhelms any concern that the sug-
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hearing examiner must be limited accordingly so that the promise of
Goldberg is not reduced to whatever due process can be had in ten
minutes or less.
2. Accuracy and Accountability in
Administration of Welfare Programs in New
York
The extraordinary volume of welfare hearings requested and
adjudicated in New York state looms over a discussion of a right to
counsel. Therefore, we conclude with a brief exposition of the rea-
sons for this phenomenon and urge remediation. The availability to
state and local welfare departments of attainable and systemic re-
forms that would sharply reduce the demand for hearings is not only
relevant to the due process analysis, since it relates to the question of
governmental interest and fiscal burden, but would also make the
consideration of assigning counsel a much less daunting policy
proposition.
It is a persistent source of frustration for appellants, advo-
cates, and for some government officials, that large numbers of ad-
ministrative errors, minor disputes, and misunderstandings that might
easily and informally be resolved at the welfare center, are routinely
and systematically channeled into the fair hearing process. Over the
last twenty-five years, state and local bar associations have repeatedly
studied this phenomenon, and issued reports criticizing the quality of
the decision making process in local welfare agencies, the extent to
which that process deprives thousands of the State's most vulnerable
gested reforms would render the process any less fair.
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families of substantive assistance and places harmful pressure on the
administrative appeals process, and the apparent lack of systemic ac-
countability. 20 3 In 2002, the New York State Bar Association, the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and the New York
County Lawyers Association jointly filed an amicus brief that dis-
cussed the persistent and destructive dysfunctionality of welfare ad-
ministration in New York:
For more than 14 years, the New York State Bar As-
sociation has reported that the most profound problem
confronting the indigent in the adjudication of their
rights is the inadequate performance of local social
services districts and the inadequate supervision of
those districts by the very state agency identified in
this appeal.20 4
The brief goes on to cite a 1988 State Bar Association report
whose authors had primarily intended to investigate the state hearing
process, but who felt compelled to focus instead upon local agency
practices that drove thousands of clients to seek refuge in fair hear-
ings. That report made the following findings:
* It is manifest that local agencies are simply not
following law in a substantial percentage of cases.
* In large numbers, clients have their benefits erro-
neously denied, reduced, or terminated. The same
errors occur repeatedly.
* Most [fair hearing appellants] appear pro se and
often are persons least able to competently repre-
203 See infra Part IV.C.2.
204 Brief of the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-
Appellant at 12, Wittlinger v. Wing, 786 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 2003) (No. 404603/99), 2002
WL 32173747.
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sent themselves, many not having the ability to
speak or write English, let alone the ability to
comprehend the often technical requirements of
laws governing their entitlement to public assis-
tance.
* Because of inadequate screening and misinforma-
tion among agency caseworkers, many cases need-
lessly go to the fair hearing stage, where clients of-
ten must have a lawyer in order to gain access to
205justice.
The 2002 amicus brief noted that the State Bar Association repeat-
edly "revisited the same issues" in the years following its report, but
"found little or no improvement.,' 20 6
Local agency administration has arguably shown modest im-
provement in recent years, but at least one indicator of the persistence
of the problem is the fact that hearing requests have remained at his-
toric levels, even while the case load has been reduced by half. In
other words, the number of hearing requests, as a percentage of the
caseload, is at or near an all-time high. The endemic failure of local
agencies to adhere to mandates of law, regulation, and policy, com-
bined with an all too frequent rigidity that discourages informal reso-
lution of difficulties, inevitably leads to the extraordinary volume of
hearing requests that has long characterized the New York public
benefits system. Due process for the intended beneficiaries of this
system requires exhaustive reform of the ground level decision mak-
ing process.0
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See Mashaw, supra note 149, at 823 (warning that a regime of adversarial due process
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg formed part of a
due process revolution that deservedly receives praise for its empha-
sis on participation, accountability, and transparency. Even more, the
due process rights of notice and opportunity to be heard afford a
source of optimism and hope for individuals whose daily subsistence
might otherwise turn on the whim and caprice of a welfare bureauc-
racy wielding unfettered authority. But the implementation of Gold-
berg falls short in leaving poor people to the frequently insuperable
task of negotiating a complex and arcane administrative system with-
out representation. The right to counsel, however, is an underen-
forced norm that demands realization by the legislature, even if
courts regard themselves as institutionally equipped to protect that
right. Due process and the rule of law require no less.
hearings is an insufficient response to endemic failures in the administration of large-scale
social welfare programs and provides inadequate protection to the intended beneficiaries of
those programs, and that due process requires a "management approach to ground level ad-
ministration that assures accuracy, fairness, and timeliness" at that level.)
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APPENDIX
The following are unofficial transcripts of two pro se hearings
conducted in New York City, both of which resulted in rulings against
the pro se appellant. Names have been altered to safeguard the indi-
viduals' privacy. We do not assert that these transcripts represent
the typical pro se hearing. Nor, however, do we believe that hearings
of the nature captured by the transcripts are especially uncommon.
Pro Se Hearing A
PROCEEDINGS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: My name is Jane Judge
and I have been designated by the Commissioner to conduct this
hearing requested by Roberta Recipient, 123 Main Street, Apartment
IA.
MS. CLAIMANT: And I'm Clara CLAIMANT because it's
my case.
ADMINISTRTIVE LAW JUDGE: Who is Roberta Recipi-
ent?
MS. CLAIMANT: (Indecipherable two words) her name.
MS. CLAIMANT: Her name is on the budget, but she's not -
she was originally - we were getting Welfare with her, but they just
left her name on the card, but it's my case.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Is she getting Welfare?
Ms. CLAIMANT: NO, she's on SSI. Her name is just on the
card and her case is on the card, but she doesn't get anything.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: How old are you?
MS. CLAIMANT: 20.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: (Inaudible one word) her
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name. And who lives with you besides your mother?
MS. CLAIMANT: My sister and my son and (inaudible two
to three words).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Is that your son?
MS. CLAIMANT: Yeah.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: How old?
MS. CLAIMANT: Four.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: All right. What do we
have here, Ms. City Representative?
MS. CITY REP: We have a notice to discontinue benefits as
of April 2 5th for failure to comply with the (indecipherable one
word). The
client -
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Agency Number 1.
(Whereupon, a document was marked for identification and received
into evidence as Agency's Exhibit Number 1, this date.)
Ms. CITY REP: The client was scheduled for a March 2 9 h
appointment (inaudible three words) in Brooklyn.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Agency Number 2 is the
appointment in Brooklyn on the 2 9th.
(Whereupon, a document was marked for identification and
received into evidence as Agency's Exhibit Number 2, this date.)
MS. CITY REP: She failed to appear and (inaudible one
word) -
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: May 2 9th. Agency 3 and
Agency 4 are the case notes and the recommendations.
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(Whereupon, the above-described documents were marked for
identification and received into evidence as Agency's Exhibit Num-
ber 3 and 4, respectively, this date.)
ADMINSITRATIVE LAW JUDGE: All right. This was sent
- the case name is in your mother's because you're not 21 yet and
you're living with her, so this was sent for an eligibility review for
March 2 9th. No one showed up, not you or your mother.
MS. CLAIMANT: We never even got that notice. That's
what we -- I never got the notice. That's the reason why we -
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Agency 5. (Whereupon,
a document was marked for identification and received into evidence
as Agency's Exhibit Number 5, this date.)
MS. CITY REP: Did you get your closing notice?
MS. CLAIMANT: Yes, we got - that's why I come - I got
the closing notice, but I did not get a notice to come March 291h . I
think I was there like around the 26th or the 27 h, and I still never got
- I never got the (indecipherable one word) notice (indecipherable
three words).
MS. CITY REP: Well, why do you think you receive the clos-
ing notice and you didn't get that one? The address is right.
MS. CLAIMANT: The address is right. I can't -
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Well, maybe your
mother got it, or your sister?
MS. CLAIMANT: My mother didn't get it. Nobody in the
house got it because if anything, my mother would have (indecipher-
able one word) to take care of that if she would have got this, so she
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would have told me.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: All right.
MS. CLAIMANT: I don't know why it didn't come. Some-
times the mail doesn't get to the apartment. It must have been an
oversight, but I know we got the closing letter and we did not get that
letter.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Okey-doke. All right.
If there's nothing else then, the record is closed.
(Whereupon, the hearing concluded.)
Pro Se Hearing B
PROCEEDINGS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Good Morning I'm Jo-
sephine Judge, an Administrative Law Judge designated by the Com-
missioner of the State Department of Social Services to hear your
case today.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Please state your name,
address, age
MS. CLAIMANT:Claire Claimant, 456 Main Street, New
York, N.Y.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:Who else besides your-
self is on the budget?
MS. CLAIMANT:My three kids
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:Names and ages of your
children
MS. CLAIMANT:April, 15; May, 11; and June, 6.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:How much do you pay a
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month in rent?
MS. CLAIMANT: 330.....510.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:Ok, Ms. City Represen-
tative, appearance please.
MS. CITY REP:Ms. City Representative, for the Human Re-
sources Administration.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Proceed.
MS. CITY REP:Ms. Claimant was seen at her initial ap-
pointment on February 20 at the BEGIN office and refused to accept
outcome of assessment because she's a student and did not want to do
a WEP assignment
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: (to Ms. Claimant) you
don't have to fill that out, ma'am.
MS. CLAIMANT:Hmmm?
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:That's it. Okay, go
ahead.
MS. CITY REP: She attends City College and is a sociology
major and was given a training and participation denial because her
program was over two years in length and a notification of employ-
ability and right to contest. The agency mailed out a conciliation no-
tice on March 13 with deadline date of March 24 (inaudible) of
March 22. Ms. Claimant came in on March 21 and then declined to
accept the WEP assignment because of her attendance at City College
(inaudible). The agency mailed out a notice of intent on (inaudible)
with an effective date of April 24. Ms. Claimant came in on 4/18 and
again stated that she attended school and the issue was not settled and
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she applied for the fair hearing.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:Ok, you're saying that
you cannot work because you go to school ma'am?
MS. CLAIMANT: (Inaudible).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: OK where do you attend
school?
MS. CLAIMANT:City College
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:When did you begin?
MS. CLAIMANT:Last Spring
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Okay, you're getting a
BA degree or a BS?
MS. CLAIMANT:BA, not BS. What do you mean by BA?
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:Bachelor of Arts
MS. CLAIMANT:Bachelor of Arts.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:And it's a 4 year pro-
gram, right?
MS. CLAIMANT:Yes.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:Okay, Ms. City Repre-
sentative, let me have that if that's going to be your evidence. Any-
thing further?
MS. CLAIMANT:Do you need my I.D.?
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:No this is enough. Al-
right, you'll get your decision in the mail, okay? Okay, have a nice
day.
(Whereupon, the hearing concluded.)
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